Preprints are made available only from January to March and only for purposes of discussion at the meeting.

“Got to Get You into My Life”: A Case for Primitive Second-person Thoughts
James Kintz, Saint Louis University
 Recent literature in the philosophy of mind has seen an increased interest in the area of second-person thought. A second-person thought is often described as what obtains when one stands in a personal relation to another and can use the term “You,” and many claim that the mutual awareness that occurs within joint attention is only explicable in terms of irreducible second-person thoughts. However, Christopher Peacocke argues that we can explain mutual awareness using only first and third-person thoughts, seemingly eliminating the need for primitive second-person thoughts. I argue that Peacocke is mistaken to reject the need for second-person thoughts, highlighting features of mutual awareness that cannot be explained in terms of first and third-person thoughts. I suggest that these second-person thoughts are irreducible, and define such thoughts as occurring when a thinker is cognizant of another person as already set up to engage in reciprocal communication with oneself.

‘The Kids are Alright’: Justice as Fairness and Childhood Goods
Blain Neufeld, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
 Liberalism’s “citizenship-focused” framework for thinking about children and their interests arguably fails to appreciate much of what is valuable about childhood, including what may be termed “childhood goods.” Such goods include a secure sense of belonging, a capacity to engage in creative play, and an ability to live in the moment. Rawls’s “justice as fairness” seems especially vulnerable to this criticism, as it is based upon a conception of persons as adult citizens with two moral powers. There is no room within Rawls’s account of justice, according to critics like Colin Macleod, for the distinct goods of childhood. I reply to this challenge by explaining how justice as fairness can include childhood goods. Citizens have a “higher-order interest” in successfully realizing their conceptions of the good over the course of their lives, and such conceptions (almost always) include childhood goods. I conclude by discussing some institutional implications of my argument.

A Defense of Cognitive Penetration
Kate Finley, University of Notre Dame
 Cognitive Penetration, is an increasingly popular theory in philosophy and cognitive psychology which holds that semantic or representational mental states, such as beliefs, goals, and concepts, may sometimes affect phenomenal qualities of our perceptual experiences. A somewhat standard definition has emerged, according to which Cognitive Penetration occurs iff a mental state influences a perceptual experience such that: 1) this influence occurs within the confines of early vision, 2) the perceptual experience draws on the mental state as an informational resource, and 3) this explanation is not subject to any explanatory defeaters. Studies purporting to show evidence of have been subject to many recent attacks, the strongest being: the Replication objection, the El Greco objection, and the Judgement objection. I argue that each objection fails to undermine key sets of evidence targeted by their authors, and that furthermore, proper understanding of these objections can help provide support for Cognitive Penetration.

A House Is Not a Home: The Domestic Analogy in Just War Theory
Elizabeth Lanphier, Vanderbilt University
 Is defense of home or homeland a just cause to use lethal force? In the just war tradition, a domestic analogy that links defense of individual property to defense of the homeland suggests that it is. This argument persists in contemporary cosmopolitan accounts of just war, which hold that while state borders are irrelevant, defense of an individual or jointly held interest in a house, and by extension a territory, is a just cause for the use of lethal force or war. While I maintain that there is a human need for a home, the domestic analogy is in fact concerned not with a home, but a house. Unlike a home, a house is based in property rights and institutional structures. Furthermore the right to a home does not entail the right to and defense of a particular homeland, nor even, perhaps, defense of a particular home.

A More Promising Argument Against Libertarianism
Seth Shabo, University of Delaware
 Peter van Inwagen has recently revised his Promising Argument, an influential challenge to libertarianism. As van Inwagen acknowledges, the revised argument remains problematic. Here I offer a different diagnosis of where the Promising Argument goes wrong. I then set out a new argument that builds on what van Inwagen’s argument gets right. Whereas the Promising Argument asks whether a supposedly free agent could promise in advance to take a particular course of action, the Reasonable Expectations Argument focuses instead on what can reasonably be expected of such an agent at the time of action. If they cannot reasonably be expected at this time to do the right thing, we have good reason to deny that their actions are exercises of free will, contrary to what libertarians believe.

A New Argument Against “Ought” Implies “Can”
P. Roger Turner, Walters State Community College
 In ethics, there is a widely held principle that if you are morally obligated to do something, then this means you can do the thing you’re obligated to do. This is the principle that “ought” implies “can.” Though this principle is plausible, I think that it is false. And, while some philosophers have tried to show that this principle is false by counterexample (by, for instance Frankfurt-style cases, or by cases of moral dilemma), I will take a different tack. The tack I will take begins with the assumption that most moral philosophers reject the divine command theory of ethics, and this for reasons having something to do with the famous Euthyphro Dilemma. But, as I’ll go on to argue, these Euthyphro-driven reasons for rejecting divine command theory should lead us to conclude that it is false that “ought” implies “can.”

A New Theory of Epistemic Possibility
Brandon Carey, California State University, Sacramento
 Standard theories of epistemic possibility analyze this relation in terms of either knowledge, entailment, or probability. These theories are mistaken. Here, I present counterexamples to the standard theories and defend a new theory: that a proposition is epistemically possible on some body of evidence just in case that evidence supports that if the proposition were true, then the evidence might exist. This new account avoids the problems of the standard theories, as well was explaining the use of counterfactuals in reasoning about epistemic possibilities.

A Philosophical Perspective on Algebraic Models for Modal Logics
Peter Fritz, Universitetet i Oslo
 Algebraic models for propositional modal logics are well known, and widely used in modal logic. However, they are often presented as mere formal tools, in contrast to possible world models. I will argue that it is in fact easier to give an explicit account of the role of algebraic models in investigating the logic of necessity and possibility than to give a similar account for possible world models. The situation is subtler in the case of quantified modal logics, as there are natural possible world structures invalidating the Barcan formula and its converse, involving variable domains, and it is not obvious how to extend algebraic models analogously. I show that algebraic models for propositional modal logics can in fact be extended to provide model theories for such quantified modal logics in ways which are just as natural as the addition of variable domains in the case of possible world models.

A Problem in Plato’s Hagiography of Socrates
Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College
 The problem can be stated as a trilemma: (1) Socrates is an exemplar of virtue. (2) Virtue is a kind of knowledge. (3) Socrates lacks this knowledge. If we accept (2) and (3), it seems Socrates cannot be virtuous, which conflicts with (1). If we accept (1) and (2), it seems that Socrates cannot be telling the truth when he disclaims having the knowledge of virtue (3). If we accept (1) and (3), it seems we cannot accept Socratic virtue intellectualism (2). In this paper, I seek to show that we can actually accept each of the above claims. But in order to do so, we must recognize something about each one of the claims that has not received adequate attention in the scholarly literature. Once we attend to what has gone mostly unattended, however, the three claims can be seen as fully consistent.

A Social Epistemic Rationale for the Absolute Freedom of Speech in Mill’s On Liberty: Why We Must Put Up with Flat-earthers of All Kinds
Ava Thomas Wright, University of Georgia
 Why must we respect others’ rights to express opinions that contradict the most well-established of our knowledge claims, such as, for example, that the earth is round, or that humans evolved, or that climate change is occurring? Is it because our scientific knowledge of such matters is not certain or completely justified? In this paper I try to make sense of some of Mill’s epistemic claims in On Liberty by arguing that Mill implicitly distinguishes two kinds of warrant for true and justified opinions: 1) a direct, individual warrant that a domain expert such as a scientist holds for his or her knowledge “proper,” and 2) a partly direct but largely social warrant that a non-expert holds for what Mill refers to as his or her “rationally assured” opinions. I argue that Mill understands the absolute right of free expression to underwrite each kind of warrant in a different way.

A Tension in the Best System Account of Laws of Nature
Chris Dorst, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 There is a serious tension in David Lewis’s Best System Account of laws of nature. It arises because of two incongruent ways in which Lewis attempts to hold his theory accountable to actual scientific practice. That is, he attempts to respect both scientific methods and scientific results in an incompatible way. This tension, however, has gone largely unnoticed in the philosophical literature on laws. This is likely because it only becomes apparent when we articulate Lewis’s theory in a particular way. My goal in this paper is to explicate this tension and show why it is problematic.

Abductively Robust Inference
Finnur Dellsen, University College Dublin
 Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is widely criticized for being an unreliable form of ampliative inference—partly because the explanatory hypotheses we have considered at a given time may all be false, and partly because there is an asymmetry between the comparative judgment on which an IBE is based and the absolute verdict that IBE is meant to license. In this paper, I present a further reason to doubt the epistemic merits of IBE and argue that it motivates moving to an inferential pattern in which IBE emerges as a degenerate limiting case. Since this inferential pattern is structurally similar to an argumentative strategy known as Inferential Robustness Analysis (IRA), it effectively combines the most attractive features of IBE and IRA into a unified approach to non-deductive inference.

Absence Causation and Supervenience
Isaiah Lin, Syracuse University
 Carolina Sartorio’s actual-sequence view, ACS, relies on the truth of (1) the supervenience of facts about freedom on facts about actual causal sequences and (2) the genuine possibility of absence causation. Here, I argue that simultaneously endorsing both (1) and (2) is more challenging than we might have originally thought, since the solution Sartorio adopts to resolve a metaphysical objection to (2) betrays the motivations we have for (1).

Accountability for Implicit Bias
Kathleen Connelly, University of California–San Diego
 I argue that we are justified in holding people accountable for actions motivated by implicit bias. This claim, while intuitively appealing, is not immediately easy to reconcile with familiar models of moral responsibility. We often let people off the hook if they did not intend to do anything wrong; why blame someone who acted on bias without intending to do so? I draw on Peter Railton’s work to explain why we can hold people morally responsible for actions born of the automatic, non-deliberative parts of our agency: they are central, reasons-responsive aspects of our practical rationality. Moreover, I argue that agents have control over these processes in the kind of way that makes it fair, not merely to attribute these actions to agents, but to hold agents accountable for them. As implicit biases are these kinds of non-deliberative processes, we can therefore hold people accountable for acting on implicit biases.

Accountability, Desert, and Punishment
Dana Kay Nelkin, University of California, San Diego
 Intriguing arguments have recently been added to the case for the claims that what culpable wrongdoers deserve to suffer is the experience of guilt (see Clarke (2016), McKenna (manuscript)), and that their so suffering this particular harm is a non-instrumental good. This idea has in turn been employed in arguments that punishment of culpable wrongdoers, is also deserved, justified, and a non-instrumental good (see McKenna, Duff 2003). In this paper, I assess these claims, tentatively concluding that even if wrongdoers deserve to suffer, it is not a non-instrumental good that they do, and that punishment is not justified as a means to the special suffering of guilt even if it were such a good. This conclusion leads neither to a quarantine model of the treatment of criminals (see Pereboom 2014, Caruso 2016), nor a pure utilitarian theory, however, and in this paper, I explain why.

Advanced Modalizing for the Modal Realist: A Reply to Jago
Cameron Gibbs, University of Massachusetts Amherst
 The modal realist that analyzes modality in terms of quantification over possible worlds has a puzzle regarding how to understand modal claims about the pluriverse of worlds itself. For example, how should the modal realist understand “possibly, there are many possible worlds?” Such claims are called advanced modal claims. An influential way to handle advanced modal claims is John Diver’s Redundancy account, according to which modal operators are redundant in advanced modal claims. In “Advanced Modalizing Problems” Mark Jago has argued that the redundancy account fails to accommodate all advanced modal claims. He then argues that various other approaches cannot handle advanced modal claims, concluding that the modal realist cannot analyze modality. However, I argue that there is a natural generalization of the redundancy account that avoids Jago’s problem cases. I conclude that Jago has not given us a reason to think that the modal realist cannot analyze modality.

Aesthetics in India During British Rule: Strategic Choices, Cosmopolitan Sensibilities
Nalini Bhushan, Smith College
 Two fundamental questions animate Indian aesthetics during the colonial period: (1) What makes Indian art authentically Indian?; (2) how can remain authentically Indian while being creative, modern and relevant to the global art scene? This essay undertakes a close reading of the work of two prominent Indian aestheticians in the colonial period, Mulk Raj Anand and KC Bhattacharyya, so as to illuminate the subtle ways in which each of their work is both cross-cultural and cosmopolitan. In each case I am interested not simply in the content of their respective theories of rasa (the central concept in Indian aesthetics), but also in the ways in which they each craft their essays. Discussion of the interaction of form and content allows us to see clearly the shape of their respective programs, and enables us to reflect on the creative devices philosophers used to complicate the power dynamic in the Indian Academy.

Against “Freedom of Religion”
Orlin Vakarelov, Duke University
 We argue that the right “Freedom of Religion” is superfluous for a liberal democracy. More specifically, we look at the use of rights as trumps in legal adjudication mechanisms inside a state. This is the place where rights are exercised. We argue that religious groups make a distinct class of assignations, because religions have some delimiting characteristic—we identify three such types of characteristics: (1) the presence of supernatural explanations and supernatural origin of values; (2) the structure of reflective epistemology and the assignment of moral status to some reflective beliefs; and (3) assignment of consequences to mere exercising of thoughts or holding of beliefs. We argue that the intra-institutional adjudication mechanism, as a system for deliberation, must meet a set of conditions that preclude it form accepting as right claims based on the characteristics.

Against Willed Normativity: A Critique of Ruth Chang’s Hybrid Voluntarism
Andrew Flynn, University of California–Los Angeles
 Recently, Ruth Chang has attempted to rescue the heavily criticized voluntarist account of the source of normativity by going hybrid. Voluntarist reasons cease to be problematic, Chang argues, if they are constrained by given reasons that find their source in an agent’s desires or a realm of normative facts. Furthermore, voluntarist reasons are necessary to account for an agent’s ability to create her ideal rational self. In this paper, I contest this second claim, arguing that a pure given reasons account can make sufficient sense of self-creation.

An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs
Eleonore Neufeld, University of Southern California
 The aim of this paper is to propose an essentialist model of the semantics of slurs. Similarly to other kind terms, slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of the social group in question. The truth-conditional contribution of slur nouns can then be captured by the following schema: For a given slur S of a social group G and a person P, S is true of P iff P bears the ‘essence’ of G, which is causally responsible and explains stereotypical negative features associated with G. A particularly interesting quality of my theory is that it has the consequence that slurs don’t refer, and sentences containing them are thus either meaningless or false.

An Integrated Theory of Humility
Matt Barker, Concordia University
 This paper introduces and argues for the plausibility of a new and integrated theory about the nature of humility. This is timely because appeals to humility are easily found in academic work and everyday life, and yet compared to many other traits there is much less theorizing about what humility is exactly. This lack resides in and hampers both philosophical literatures, especially those on virtue theory, and scientific ones. At the theory’s heart is the claim that humility has two core features that reinforce each other and are important causes of many other typical aspects of humility. One core feature, more self-regarding, is being disposed to motivating and unabsorbed reasonable self-perspectives. The other core feature, more other-regarding, is being disposed to bigger picture selflessness. I show how their reinforcing and causally basic status helps integrate empirically documented distinct aspects of humility, and best explains evidence for humility’s integrated nature.

Anti-realist Moral Progress and the Problem of Moral Reformers
Charlie Kurth, Washington University in St. Louis
 Accommodationist anti-realists want to make sense of moral progress. To do this, they standardly appeal to our general responsiveness to social pressure against being morally inconsistent. But moral reformers (e.g., abolitionists, suffragists) present an unappreciated challenge to this picture: their deliberations display an independence of mind that fits poorly with the accommodationists’ moral psychology. However, a closer look at the decision making of reformers reveals that their distinctive independence of thought is undergirded by an unease—an anxiety—about what to do in the face of moral uncertainty. Taking note of this paves the way to a better accommodationist account.

Are Children Capable of Collective Intentionality?
Laura Kane, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 The paradigm examples that illustrate collective intentionality—painting a house, making a sauce—typically demonstrate cooperative activity between two ideal agents. Thus, they ignore perhaps the most important cooperative activity—familial care—and the complicated makeup of a family’s cooperating agents: adults and children. It is commonly argued that children are not capable of collective intentionality; children are unable to make joint commitments, perform joint activities, or act reciprocally. This is because most accounts of collective intentionality involve a narrow conception of agency that cannot be extended beyond an ideal (fully-developed adult) agent. In this poster I argue that children are agents who are capable of collective intentionality, especially in the context of the family where children act cooperatively and reciprocally with their caretakers.

Aristotelian Naturalism and the Great Red Dragon
Scott Woodcock, University of Victoria
 In this paper I present a new objection to the Aristotelian Naturalism (AN) defended by Philippa Foot. I describe this objection as a membership objection because it reveals the fact that AN invites counterexamples when pressed to identify the individuals bound by its normative claims. I present three examples of agents for whom the norms generated by AN are not obviously authoritative: mutants, aliens and the Great Red Dragon. Those who continue to advocate for Foot’s view can give compelling replies to the first two of these examples, but their replies drive the view into an unwelcome result when it faces the last example. I conclude that the concept of being human, on which AN crucially depends, is not as straightforward as Foot’s advocates presume.

Aristotelian Temperance and the Quasi-reasoning of Appetites
Erica Holberg, Utah State University
 This paper explores the tension between Aristotle’s argument that temperance concerns the animal pleasures of touch and his claim that temperance preserves phronesis. The former suggests a view of temperance as constraint of (animal) pleasures; the latter a view of temperance as transformation of the individual’s general relation to pleasure. I show how we can reconcile these two conceptions of temperance by using Aristotle’s distinction between natural and peculiar appetites: we become temperate through constraining our (peculiar) pleasures, but the exercise of temperance requires a transformation in how the agent’s pleasures figure in her pursuit of the human good. I argue that to do justice to the fullness of Aristotle’s conception of temperance, we require a cognitively richer conception of pleasure.

Aristotle on the Doctor
Samuel Baker, University of South Alabama
 This paper is a reconstruction of Aristotle’s account of the art of medicine—that is, of the doctor, qua doctor. I argue that the art of medicine is a productive expertise with an essential teleological ordering towards health. Both the doctor and the natural philosopher consider the same subject matter but to different ends. Moreover, the doctor must rely on the natural philosopher to understand what health is. While a doctor could use his art of medicine to produce disease that would be an “accidental” use of the art of medicine and the doctor would not do so qua doctor. Aristotle’s account has nontrivial implications: for example, a doctor qua doctor could not perform active euthanasia. Neither the will of the doctor nor the preferences of the patient can have any effect on the end of the medical art, which is health.

Bayesian Coherentism
Lisa Cassell, University of Massachusetts Amherst
 Bayesianism is committed to norms that govern our credences in propositions that stand in particular logical relations to each other at each time. It’s also committed to norms that govern how these credences change over time in response to new evidence. Traditional Bayesian epistemology is coherentist with respect to the first set of norms. It’s foundationalist with respect to the second. It has two strands of justification running through it. This paper considers a problem for Bayesianism’s second strand of justification, and proposes a solution to it. The problem? While Bayesian conditioning has a foundationalist structure, this foundationalism disappears once we move to Jeffrey conditioning. Since Bayesian conditioning is a special case of Jeffrey conditioning, the former’s strong foundations make it look like a “degenerate” case of the latter. The solution? To understand Bayesian updating as a form of coherentism.

Bayesian Evidence and Modality
Conor Mayo-Wilson, University of Washington
 Epistemologists widely agree that some modal condition (e.g., safety) is necessary for possessing knowledge, justified belief, and/or evidence. An equally large number of epistemologists and philosophers of science endorse Bayesianism. I argue that the two commitments conflict. More precisely, I argue that three modal theories of evidence are inconsistent with the conjunction of Bayesianism and the following intuitive principle: (*) Let H be any hypothesis and A and B be two agents. Suppose that A and B have identical prior degrees of belief in H. Further, assume that A later receives only new evidence for H, whereas B does not receive any new evidence for H. Then A’s posterior degree of belief in H ought to be greater than that of B. My argument uses a well-known example due to [Berger and Wolpert, 1988], which illustrates that classical statistical tests violate the likelihood principle.

Biographical Identity and Retrospective Attitudes
Camil Golub, New York University
 We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. In this paper I ask what, if anything, accounts for such conservative attitudes. First I examine some possible answers: (i) the lack of direct psychological connections with our merely possible selves; (ii) a general conservatism about value; (iii) the importance of our actual relationships and long-term projects. I argue that these answers are all incorrect or incomplete. Then I offer my own proposal, inspired by R.M. Adams’ (1979) answer to the problem of evil: it is reasonable not to regret many things in our past because they contributed to who we are. Our biographical identities constrain the live options for our retrospective attitudes. I end by connecting this proposal with recent narrative accounts of personal identity.

By-standers to Free Expression: Connecting a Theory of Free Expression to Applied Social Epistemology and Critical Theory of Politics
Manuela Ungureanu, University of British Columbia Okanagan
 Philosophers interested in issues surrounding free speech are divided by their adopting either a robust normative approach to our alleged rights to expression (Haworth 1998, Dworkin 1999) or one requiring comprehensive descriptive accounts of the pragmatic norms governing our communicative practices (Langton 2012). But neither perspective suffices to tackle the standpoint taken by the subjects themselves about their free expression in conditions of political repression. I explore their respective limitations in accommodating stories from the recent history of Eastern European communism and especially its intellectuals’ testimonies of free expression. I highlight and examine the crucial role institutions such as publishing houses, universities, broadcasters play in shaping free expression, and argue that coming to terms with such cases involves a critical social theory of the socio-political, historical and legal conditions for free speech (Forst 2005, 2015, Moon 2000) and the adoption of a standpoint epistemology of political knowledge (Anderson 2012).

Can I Know What I Would Have Freely Done?
Jeffrey Watson, Arizona State University
 A familiar problem in the philosophy of religion concerns whether divine “middle-knowledge” of counterfactuals of human action is compatible with human freedom and moral responsibility. I propose that a parallel problem arises for our own claims to know counterfactuals of human action. Knowledge requires truth. Truths require truthmakers. Truthmakers necessitate what they make true. If I would have acted one way in a counterfactual situation, then could not have done otherwise in that situation. Freedom and moral responsibility, however, are often thought to require the ability to do otherwise. After raising this novel problem, I suggest a possible solution.

Causal Blame
Eugene Chislenko, Temple University
 We blame faulty brakes for a car crash, or rain for our bad mood. This merely “causal” blame seems less interesting than the blame with which we target ourselves and each other. Accordingly, neither causal blame nor its relation to interpersonal blame has been investigated in detail. In this paper, I argue that causal blame is crucial for understanding interpersonal blame. The two are often difficult to distinguish, in a way that plagues philosophical discussions of blame. And interpersonal blame is distinctive, I argue, partly in its causal focus: its attention to a person as cause. I argue that this causal focus helps explain several central characteristics of interpersonal blame, such as its tendency to exaggerate a person’s causal role, its weakening through attention to personal history or thoughts about determinism, its characteristic “force” or “sting,” and our sense that blame is often harmful or unfair.

Causal Exclusion and Constitution
Kenneth Silver, University of Southern California
 The causal exclusion problem purports to show that mental properties cannot have physical effects unless those properties are identical to their physical realizers. However, some non-reductive physicalists have argued that it is in virtue of a particular relation of non-identity that the mental is not excluded. Here, I consider whether the mental could avoid exclusion if it were constituted by the physical. Items that stand in the relation of constitution are able to share in certain properties, and so if the mental were constituted, then it could have physical effects by sharing in the properties that cause those effects. However, this response still faces the the problem of showing how the mental causes in virtue of it’s being mental. To answer this, I appeal to a distinction amongst properties in the literature on constitution. What matters on this view is what something causes regardless of what constitutes it.

Causation and Responsibility for Outcomes
Philip Swenson, Rutgers University
 There is a persistently troublesome puzzle concerning the transmission of moral responsibility from actions and omissions to outcomes. On the one hand there are cases of action in which responsibility appears to transmit to an outcome despite the fact that the agent could not have prevented the outcome. On the other hand there are similar cases of omission in which responsibility does not appear to transmit to an outcome. One seemingly plausible solution to this puzzle is to posit an underlying causal asymmetry between the action cases and the omission cases. I argue that this solution fails and that the puzzle remains unresolved.

Causation and the Raven Paradox
Barry M. Ward, University of Arkansas
 Standard Bayesian resolutions of Hempel’s paradox employ random sampling models and restrict the relevant data to whether samples are ravens and/or black. However, random sampling of the relevant population is unfeasible, and additional data is salient to confirmation—that a sample is an arctic raven, for instance. We propose an alternative model: targeting a variety of cases individuated by background causal beliefs. On this model, a causal asymmetry resolves the paradox. There are broader implications. Science is largely concerned with theories of broad predictive scope, and as Hume observed, causal generalizations play an integral role in prediction. So, we can expect typical scientifically interesting generalizations to relate factors for which the relevant causal asymmetry holds, and hence, to have an associated class of non-paradoxical paradigm confirmers.

Challenging Generics: Why There’s No ‘No True Scotsman’ Fallacy
Kathryn Lindeman, Saint Louis University
 Current agreement seems to be that the following involves a fallacy: Peter: Christians love their enemies. Saul: Some Christians kill abortion doctors they view as enemies! Peter: Well, true Christians love their enemies. I argue that it isn’t. I present and defend a reading of these kinds of exchanges on which they involve answered challenges to normative generics rather than ad hoc revisions in light of counterexamples to negated existential claims. Additionally, I discuss important practical implications of understanding how people make and respond to challenges to normative generics.

Computing Machinery and Gender: The Gendered Presuppositions Underlying the Turing Test
Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College
 For more than half a century now there has been considerable debate about whether The Turing Test is an adequate test for thinking. But what has not been much discussed are the gendered presuppositions underlying the test. Forgotten in the philosophical discussion is the fact that Turing’s imitation game is modeled on an imitation game in which a neutral questioner communicates with two different humans—one a man and one a woman—without knowing which is which. In this original imitation game, the man wins the game if he is able to fool the questioner into identifying him as the woman. In this paper, I explore the implications of this set-up. When we frame the question of artificial intelligence on the model of artificial gender, how does that affect the conclusions we draw about intelligence?

Consequentialism and Moral Color
Xiaofei Liu, Xiamen University
 Consequentialism’s employment of an inclusive theory of the good has always been an effective defense mechanism against criticisms from other ethicists. This paper raises a different objection to consequentialism, one in which this inclusive theory of the good becomes a liability. Our experimental studies show that people do not regard an act that produces the best available outcome as bearing any moral color, when the good involved is not obviously of moral nature. Given that consequentialist’s theory of the good is indiscriminative between moral and non-moral value, it then becomes questionable whether “maximizing the good” qualifies as a criterion of moral rightness.

Constructive “Consent:” A Dangerous Fiction
M. Beth Henzel, Rutgers University
 Consent, plus the appropriate circumstances, can make an impermissible action permissible. Consent gains this “moral magic” from the way it respects and enhances autonomy. While often requiring prescriptive (standard) consent, we occasionally treat agents as if they consented when we know they haven’t. This attribution of consent has been called “imputed consent,” “pseudo-consent,” and “fictitious consent.” Bearing the label “fictitious consent,” constructive consent arises when we treat an agent as if she consented to F because she did G. By examining constructive consent in law (monitoring prison phones and administering BAC tests to unconscious drivers) and daily life (physical contact in public spaces), I show that constructive consent doesn’t respect or enhance autonomy. If the imputation of consent isn’t directed by the value of personal agency, then it may diminish the very autonomy consent proper promotes. We thus should be explicit that such cases don’t involve consent and its justification.

Contrary-to-duty Obligations and Ordering Semantics : The Story after Chisholm’s Paradox
Yuna Won, Cornell University
 It is commonly believed that Chisholm’s Paradox, one of the most famous deontic logic paradoxes, arises only in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) but not in ordering semantics, which is now the orthodox semantics for conditionals and modals. However, ordering semantics fails to adequately capture the core concept of contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations and our reasoning with them in our normative discourse. In this paper, I prove the limitation of ordering semantics with CTD obligations by formulating a new deontic puzzle, the CTD Trilemma, extending the familiar example from Chisholm’s Paradox. I examine possible reactions of the proponents of ordering semantics, especially the approach to solve Chisholm’s Paradox and the CTD trilemma by introducing temporal elements, and prove that these attempts cannot avoid the CTD trilemma.

Core Intellectual Virtues and Epistemic Villains in the Xunzi
Kuan-Hung Chen, University of Hawaii at Manoa
 The virtue turn in epistemology opens a window to reexamine the epistemic stances of classical Chinese thinkers. This essay discusses some of the core intellectual virtues that Xunzi identifies in relation to the cultivation of the heart-mind, on the one hand, and a special category that can be termed as “epistemic villains,” on the other hand. The Xunzian version of epistemic villains does not refer to people who do not engage in self-cultivation and, as a consequence, lack cultivated intellectual virtues. On the contrary, epistemic villains for Xunzi are those who constantly invest in being hypocritical in social locations where epistemic exemplars should serve. I suggest that the further development of the concept of “epistemic villain” is beneficial for virtue epistemologists to consider the importance of social location in the making of epistemic normativity.

Could Sartre Have Been a Compatibilist?
Joshua Tepley, Saint Anselm College
 Sartre is undeniably an incompatibilist about free will and determinism. Nevertheless, there are significant portions of his philosophy of freedom that lend themselves to compatibilist interpretations. In this paper I identify not one but three different ways in which Sartre’s philosophy of freedom could have been a version of compatibilism. One fortunate consequence of this discussion is that it shows how Sartre’s philosophy of freedom is available to a much wider philosophical audience than is usually supposed.

Counterfactual Approaches to Causation
Michael Tooley, University of Colorado Boulder
 One of the most widely accepted approaches to causation involves analyzing causation in counterfactual terms. Such an approach requires an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals that does not itself involve the concept of causation, and I shall examine two possibilities. First, there is the approach defended by David Lewis, according to which counterfactuals can be analyzed in terms of closeness relations across possible worlds. Second, there is the approach set out by John Collins, Ned Hall, and L.A. Paul, in which the truth conditions for counterfactuals are given in terms of the concepts of laws of nature and temporal priority. I shall examine these two alternatives, and argue that neither Lewis’s approach nor that of Collins, Hall, and Paul enables one to set out a satisfactory analysis of the concept of causation.

Creating a Catalogue of Virtues: Humanity, Society, and Taste in Hume’s Moral Philosophy
Bowen Chan, University of Toronto
 Hume’s sentiment-based account of virtue appears to conflict with our commonsensical view that virtues are specified independently of idiosyncratic feelings. For instance, Hume has been condemned as a subjectivist, because he says a virtue is “whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary” (E App. 1.10). This, however, exaggerates his pessimism towards the universality of virtues. Although most now agree that Hume is not a subjectivist, but an intersubjectivist, his defenders tend to be overly optimistic about his views on human nature, distorting his appreciation of diversity. Hume, as I argue, is optimistic that our common humanity supports some universal virtues of benevolence, justice, and other social virtues, but is pessimistic insofar as he suggests that our diverse tastes and preferences limit the extent to which everyone across each age and nation should share the same set of virtues.

Cross-contextual Semantics
Ephraim Glick, University of St. Andrews
 An utterance sometimes takes long enough to produce that it extends across semantically relevant contextual changes. Those can include changes in the features of context that determine the interpretation of indexicals and other context-sensitive items. The standard semantic approach to context-sensitivity does not accommodate this fact in a natural way. In this paper I sketch an alternative approach that is more appealing.

Dangerous Speech
Jeffrey Howard, University College London
 One powerful reason to ban hate speech is that it is dangerous: it risks inspiring listeners to engage in violence. Yet many condemn this position as incompatible with respect for listener autonomy. If we view agents as capable of making up their own minds about what to believe and do, we must not countenance efforts by the state to censor the messages to which they are exposed. This paper identifies a puzzle for this view. If hateful speech should remain legal because listeners are themselves responsible for whether to act on its sinister message, why shouldn’t direct incitement to violence be legal for the same reason? I argue that this differential treatment of direct incitement and hate speech cannot be justified on any plausible theory of the right to freedom of expression. After establishing this conclusion, I sketch the general case for the criminalization of dangerous hate speech.

Defining and Simplifying the Second Incompleteness Theorem
Joachim Mueller-Theys, Independent Scholar
 Consistent theories have infinitely many non-theorems anyway. Thus it does not suffice for so-called consistency sentences to be non-theorems: they must also state consistency. If sta-con is defined by being true in the standard model if and only if the theory regarded is consistent, Goedel’s Con has it. Theories can be represented in their metalogical extensions. However, arithmetical theories cannot be represented within themselves if they are “sufficiently strong”. A closer look to this crucial result has shown that global negative representation is not possible if positive representation is given. Since the provability predicate provides the latter, there are non-theorems B such that ~Prov(#B) is a non-theorem though. Now Con’ := ~Prov(#B) is a consistency sentence already, since the sta-con predicate above applies to Con’-demonstrably. These considerations also entail a simplification of the so-called abstract form. The ASL abstract gives a more precise account.

Defusing the Darwinian Dilemma
Prach Panchakunathorn, University of Toronto
 Sharon Street’s Darwinian dilemma for moral realism has prompted many responses on behalf of the moral realist. Many of these responses accept that the dilemma is a real one (not a false dilemma), and then try to grab the “relation” horn while denying that evolutionary forces directly “track” the truth of our moral beliefs. These responses are not entirely satisfying. First, they are conditional responses, resting on substantive moral assumptions. Second, they concede too much to Street. I propose a different solution, which is not conditional and concedes much less. It involves showing, first, that the dilemma is a false dilemma and, second, that the “no relation” horn does not lead to moral scepticism and therefore is harmless.

Deontic Modals: Inference Patterns and Neutrality
Rory Harder, University of Toronto
 This paper outlines a novel semantics for deontic modals that offers a middle road between the quantitative, but non-neutral, approach of Lassiter (2011, 2014), and a competing approach that is more neutral, but qualitative (Carr 2012, 2015; Cariani 2016). This is done by drawing on Buchak’s (2013) risk-weighted expected value theory. In section 1, I present Lassiter’s semantics, its benefits, and a neutralist criticism of it. In section 2, I present Carr’s semantics, and show how its qualitative structure leads to problems with both inference patterns and neutrality (these criticisms carry over to the semantics of Cariani). In section 3, I present a Buchakean semantics and motivate it by arguing that it retains the benefits of Lassiter’s theory, but also implements neutrality in a more principled and empirically tractable way than the extant neutral proposals do.

Deontology and Distributive Justice: A Two Way Connection
Alec Walen, Rutgers University
 The means principle—which holds that it is particularly difficult to justify using people as a means without their consent—is a central principle of deontology. I have argued that it can be grounded in a deeper principle that I call the Restricting Claims Principle (RCP). At the core of the RCP is the notion of an agent’s baseline freedom, and it is set by the way agents divide the world up between themselves (a property-division). The justice of the property-division is a matter of distributive justice, and thus deontology is grounded in distributive justice. But the relationship goes in both directions. Distributive justice presupposes that it is difficult to justify using people as a means of producing wealth for others without their consent. Thus deontology and distributive justice have to be developed in tandem, and both rest on deeper fundamental principles of justice.

Dialectica Categories for the Lambek Calculus
Valeria de Paiva, Independent Scholar
Harley Eades III, Augusta University
 Dialectica categorical models of the Lambek Calculus were first presented in the Amsterdam Colloquium in 1991. There we approached the Lambek Calculus from the perspective of Linear Logic and adapted the Dialectica categorical models of Linear Logic to Lambek’s non-commutative calculus. That work took for granted the syntax of the Lambek calculus and only discussed the new models for modalities that Linear Logic introduced. Many years later we find that the work on Dialectica models of the Lambek calculus is still interesting and that it might inform some of the most recent work on the relationship between Categorial Grammars and notions of Distributional Semantics, as for instance in the work of Coecke et al. So we revisited the old work, this time making sure that the syntax details that were sketchy on the first version got completed and verified, using newer automated tools such as Agda and Ott.

Dilemmaism Defended
Joshua Mugg, Indiana University Kokomo
 Because of the way society is structured, race plays important roles in the social world. Some, such as Gendler (2011), Egan (2011), and Mugg (2013), have argued that there are cases in which, given the way race structures society, it is impossible to be both epistemically rational and moral (a position Madva 2016 calls ‘dilemmaism’). Madva (2016) replies that we might decrease the accessibility of stereotypes such that the epistemically rational agent only retrieves the information when that information is relevant to her context. I argue that Madva’s reply fails because we must activate the stereotype information to consider whether it is relevant. I go on to offer two novel arguments for dilemmaism that remain problematic, even if Madva were right.

Disease Designation and the Stigma of Addiction
Nick Harrison, University of Utah
 The disease model of addiction aims to reduce stigma. Critics, on the other hand, argue disease designation actually increases the stigma of the condition. Neither side of the debate adequately explains what they mean by stigma or how they suppose it relates to disease designation and addiction. I analyze the relationship between disease designation, stigma, and addiction by comparing it to historical and contemporary examples from psychiatry: homosexuality and current DSM categories. I show how biological explanation for disease or disorder is a double-edged sword with respect to stigma. On the one edge it can contribute to reducing the blame associated with the condition, but on the other, “biologicizing” psychiatric disorders may increase social distancing by priming people to believe that the conditions are incurable. In spite of this, I argue that the disease model, properly understood, will reduce the stigma of addiction.

Disjunctivism and Self-awareness in Martin and Merleau-Ponty
David Suarez, University of California, Berkeley
 Phenomenological theories of perception face a version of the argument from illusion. They need to show that although perception and illusion can be subjectively indistinguishable, it does not follow that an illusion’s failure to be a direct relation to an independently existing thing must be generalized to veridical perception as well. I argue here that Merleau-Ponty’s answer to the argument from illusion commits him to a form of disjunctivism that is underwritten by considerations regarding the limits of our self-awareness. I review briefly why the limits of self-awareness might be relevant to a defense of disjunctivism, looking at work by M. G. F. Martin. Next, I provide evidence that Merleau-Ponty ties the possibility of illusion to the limits of our self-awareness. Finally, I suggest that for Merleau-Ponty these limits ultimately reflect features of the temporality that structures both the objects of our awareness and our awareness itself.

Does Rawlsian Justice Realize Racial Justice?
Brian Thomas, Simon Fraser University
 Charles Mills has charged that Rawls’ work has been and remains silent to racial injustice. Tommie Shelby has recently defended Rawls from the claim that the Rawlsian view is silent in its response to racial injustice and he attempts to extend the few Rawlsian considerations about race. In this paper, I critically consider Shelby’s defense and extension of Rawlsian principles. I argue that his defense of Rawls is problematic and less effectively responds to Mills’ worries than he claims. What traction we get with Rawlsian commitments does much less in naming and redressing racial injustice. For instance, that Rawlsian commitments ignore and cannot address the injustices that novel forms of disadvantage take in the form of the carceral states and those found within the context of migration.

Does Temporal Ontology Exist?
Natalja Deng, University of Cambridge
 I examine two prominent proposals for how to elucidate what is at stake between presentists and eternalists, by Ted Sider and Christian Wuethrich. I argue that each one fails as an elucidation. The upshot is that skeptics’ pronouncements to the effect that there is something puzzling about temporal ontology have been insufficiently heeded.

Doubly Disadvantaged: The Recruitment of Diverse Subjects for Clinical Trials in Latin America
Manuela Fernandez-Pinto, Universidad de los Andes
 The paper examines the case of recruitment of underrepresented patients as subjects of clinical trials, with emphasis in Latin America. First, I argue that well-intended efforts to increase diversity in clinical trials can be used inappropriately to favor commercial interests with significant ethical and epistemic costs. Second, I argue that Latin American patients participating in such trials have a double-disadvantage. They suffer the consequences of a lack of appropriate understanding of symptoms and reaction to treatment in women and other underrepresented groups, which has led in turn to unnecessary suffering and death. Additionally, they suffer the direct consequences of being subjects in clinical trials which are not design to meet their needs, but the needs of patients in the Global North. Accordingly, I conclude by highlighting the importance of acknowledging this double disadvantage to understand the scope of the ethical and epistemic costs of clinical research in commercial settings.

Drawing Connections Between Pregnant and Transgender Embodiment
Claire Lockard, Loyola University Chicago
 This paper uses Gayle Salamon’s work on transgender embodiment and Iris Marion Young’s work on pregnant embodiment to draw two connections between trans bodies and pregnant bodies. First, Young’s account of pregnant bodies illustrates Salamon’s claim that all subjects (not just trans subjects) undertake the project of assuming a body by attempting to bridge the disjunction between bodily schema and bodily contours. Second, Young’s account of pregnancy as inherently intersubjective connects to Salamon’s claim that bodily materiality is not only socially constructed but is a social project that cannot be determined solely by the individual imagined as a unified, fully-autonomous subject. Drawing connections between trans and pregnant bodies is important for two reasons: relating often-stigmatized trans bodies to often-celebrated pregnant bodies might help de-stigmatize trans bodies. Second, thinking pregnant and trans embodiment together allows us to ask about embodied experiences of subjects who are both trans/genderqueer and pregnant.

Empathy, Impartiality, and Justice
Albert Shin, Villanova University
 A common approach to incorporating empathy into justice is to acknowledge empathy as a motivating source for correcting injustices or to see empathy as a safeguard for an overly literal, but impartial, application of the law. The underlying assumption in both is that empathy is often a source of bias: we empathize with those that are relationally closer to us, are immediately present to us, or share some features as us. In this paper, I argue that this common intuition that empathy is a common source of bias is mistaken. Studies on the impact of developing empathic and related skills suggests that bias arises when we fail to empathize, not because we do. If correct, we should not view empathy as a danger to justice, but instead an ally, exposing biases and securing impartiality which we think central to the proper administration of justice.

Environmental Nihilism: Reading Nietzsche Against New Conservationism
Kaitlyn Creasy, University of New Mexico
 In order to problematize new conservationist conceptions of nature and progress, this paper returns to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In particular, I argue that the new conservationist projection of human teleology and values onto wild nature and non-human life results in a nihilistic conception of wild nature. New conservationists believe that making environmental progress requires humanity to get rid of the idealism of “old” conservationism, but they fail to recognize they merely swap out one idealism for another and devalue non-human life and the natural world in the process.

Epicurean Moral Epistemology
Jan Maximilian Robitzsch, Sungkyunkwan University
 In this paper, I consider the Epicurean account of how human beings come to have an understanding of what is just, which has not received much attention. I argue that on the Epicurean view, agents learn what is just in the same way they learn non-moral facts, namely, through sense perception. While I think that there are also other ways of defending this thesis, I show here that the thesis follows from the fact that there is a preconception (prolepsis) of what is just. A prolepsis, on my reading, is a kind of non-inferential concept. Since prolepseis are furthermore based on sense perceptions, it follows that moral facts such as what is just are learned through sense perception according to the Epicureans.

Epistemic Injustice as a Failure of Recognition
Matthew Congdon, Vanderbilt University
 In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker argues for the existence of a sort of injustice that wrongs persons in their capacities as knowers. This paper asks how best to understand the wrong done to the victim of epistemic injustice. What does it mean for a person to be wronged “in their capacity as a knower?” Fricker’s answer turns on the notion of “epistemic objectification,” which involves an analogy between treating someone as a mere “epistemic object” and treating a person as a “mere means” in Kant’s sense. This paper illustrates the limitations of this approach and suggests an alternative, drawing from Hegelian recognition theory. The paper argues that epistemic injustice is a failure of recognition, a denial or withholding of the forms of social validation necessary for a person to achieve and uphold the normative status of “knower.”

Epistemic Logic as Epistemology
Kevin Dorst, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Higher-order evidence is evidence about what you should think. Truism: It’s nontrivial—we are not omniscient about what we should think. Problem: Once we allow it, puzzles proliferate—there seem to be cases where you know your (total) evidence will mislead you. Claim: The way to respect our truism while avoiding our problem is to trust the evidence—treat it as an expert. After arguing against previous formulations of this idea, I propose my own—Trust—formalizing the platitude that “What the evidence supports is likely to be true.” I show that Trust (1) banishes our puzzles, (2) allows higher-order uncertainty, and (3) characterizes an elegant class of models with (4) a natural interpretation. More: Our puzzles can be unified as failures of the value of information in the sense made famous by I.J. Good (1967). We then show that Trust is an epistemic characterization of the value of information.

Epistemic Modesty in Ethics
Nicholas Laskowski, University of Southern California
 Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon and many other ethicists acknowledge and accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis in ethics concerning our (in)capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing to its limit. Despite its widespread acceptance, it has received surprisingly little attention. I first explain why the thesis is true, by explaining why there are limits on our capacities to use standard approaches to the epistemology of ethical theorizing. I then argue that there are at least three significant but under appreciated implications of epistemic modesty in ethics. The first is that ideally rational agents are not guaranteed to converge even if there is no disagreement, the second is a kind of epistemic modesty about the metaphysical nature of ethics, and the third is an answer for reductivists to a prominent objection from Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, and Derek Parfit.

Epistemic Remembering
Steven James, West Chester University of Pennsylvania
 According to a generative epistemic theory of remembering (GET), memory is a genuine epistemic source, akin to other sources of knowledge such as perception. Remembering is fundamentally some kind of epistemic success. This paper argues for one central claim: among generative epistemic theories, a particularly strong one is best; i.e. remembering is best understood to be a species of knowledge. Moreover, characterizing remembering in such epistemic terms provides philosophers and psychologists with a principled and compelling way to situate remembering within the array of phenomena associated with memory systems.

Epistemic Wild Card
Yang Liu, University of Cambridge
 Isaac Levi has long challenged the legitimacy of action credences on the grounds that Deliberation Crowds out Prediction—his opponents, on the other hand, has sometimes called it the DARC thesis (Deliberation Annihilates Reflective Credence, by Alan Hajek). In this short paper we intend to approach the debate from a slightly different angle where we retrace our steps back to Frank Ramsay’s work and examine closely how probabilities are construed in his original subjectivist model. It is pointed out that in a Reason-based Action Model like Ramsey’s system, action credences lead, in the context of deliberation, to circularities in decision maker’s reasoning. We then extend our analyses of conceptual loops to Newcomb-type examples, and we use these as well as a vivid example from tennis to highlight and explain why actions play an exceptional role in Bayesian subjectivist framework.

Eudaimonistic Virtue Justification as Objectionably Egoistic?: A Two-fold Response
Adam Blincoe, University of Virginia
 In this essay I defend a eudaimonistic justification of the virtues against the charge of egoism. Eudaimonists are often thought to be committed to identifying and justifying the ethical virtues by their causal connection to the flourishing of the agent: ethical behavior is identified as that which advances eudaimonia. This sort of justification is subject to the criticism of objectionable egoism; recently Thomas Hurka has forcefully advanced this charge. This spectre of egoism has led some virtue ethicists to abandon eudaimonism for a non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics. Below I argue that such a move is unnecessary. To do this I advance a new account of eudaimonistic virtue justification: the mixed view. This, in combination with a phenomena I term ‘enmeshment’, allows eudaimonism to avoid the criticism of objectionable egoism. In the process of advancing my account I will present Hurka’s objection and identify its two foundational errors.

Evidential Preemption
Endre Begby, Simon Fraser University
 Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively insulate an audience from future evidence, thereby creating an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios.

Experience, Judgment, and Motivation
Peter Antich, University of Kentucky
 McDowell has criticized Davidson for thinking that the relation between experience and judgment is causal, and advocated that instead, we must think of it as rational. I argue that neither causality nor reason adequately describe the type of grounding relation that experience bears toward judgment. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “motivation” does a better job of describing this relationship. First, I define motivation, and argue that it must be distinguished from reason and causality as a type of ground. Second, I criticize McDowell’s account of how experience grounds judgment, arguing that the way experience is used to ground judgments doesn’t meet the criteria McDowell sets for this grounding to be rational. Finally, I offer a brief argument that causality also does a bad job of describing this relation.

Experimenting with Experimental Philosophy
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Montana State University
Don Dcruz, University of Hyderabad
Dan Flory, Montana State University
 Analytic epistemology (AE) has normative aspirations supported mostly by a priori methods involving intuitions. By contrast, experimental philosophy (EP) engages in a posteriori investigations like finding the genesis of intuitions, supplemented by the intuition varying, warrant for belief, and tool-kit theses. We address their debate by running experiments in American and Indian universities concerning two questions about Simpson’s paradox (SP): (i) why is SP paradoxical? and (ii) what should be done in SP situations?. Two competing theories that propose to explain SP are the causal and non-causal accounts. Our experiments demonstrate that the EP-motivated non-causal account addresses question (i) satisfactorily although it is psychological, whereas EP plays no role in addressing question (ii), which is an epistemological/pragmatic question that is resolved by the causal account. Although our experiments support the intuition-varying and tool-kit theses, they do not threaten AE since intuitions mined from those experiments presuppose normativity for their diagnosis.

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism
Alexander Dietz, University of Southern California
 The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure or happiness the only thing that we fundamentally desire can be self-defeating. But why might this be true? Why would desiring only pleasure make us less happy? In this paper, I develop an explanation of the paradox based on insights offered by Joseph Butler, who suggested that the paradox arises because of the nature of pleasure. I try to show how we can develop the best version of an account of this type, making use of a recent theory of pleasure, and a leading view about the requirements of rationality.

Exploring the Role of Hermeneutical Erasure in Sustaining Epistemic Oppression
Emmalon Davis, Indiana University Bloomington
 Fricker (2007) defines hermeneutical injustice as “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to hermeneutical marginalization,” (158) where hermeneutical marginalization picks out the background condition in which some are less able to contribute to the pool of shared resources. On Fricker’s account, hermeneutical injustice primarily concerns dysfunctional epistemic practices which effect the production of concepts. But dysfunctions in our hermeneutical practices occur not only within the processes through which new concepts are generated, but also within the processes through which such concepts are disseminated and utilized within a broader epistemic culture (Pohlhaus 2012). This paper identifies several dysfunctional epistemic practices which occur during these later stages and argues that such practices cannot be analyzed in terms of hermeneutical injustice. I conclude that the virtue of hermeneutical justice must be coupled with additional correctives if just epistemic environments are to be achieved.

Fair Play, White Privilege, and Black Reparations
Joseph Frigault, Boston University
 Building upon early work by John Rawls, I argue that beneficiaries of white privilege have an obligation of fair play to correct that particular form of injustice, and that their doing so constitutes a form of reparations. After identifying a specific set of conditions in which correcting systemic injustice is aptly described as a matter of fair play, and noting that in such cases it falls to those who benefit from that systemic injustice to correct it, I suggest that white privilege (which I construe as a particular form of systemic racial injustice) is one such case, and thus that it falls to beneficiaries of white privilege to correct it. Moreover, since white privilege is intimately bound-up with historic wrongdoing, I argue that correcting it constitutes a form of reparations. If that’s correct, then to this extent at least, black reparations is aptly described as a matter of fair play.

Fallacy Theory, the Negativity Problem, and Minimal Dialectical Adversariality
Scott Aikin, Vanderbilt University
 Fallacy theory has been criticized for its contributing to unnecessary adversariality in argument. The view of minimal adversariality by Trudy Govier has received similar criticism. A dialectical modification of Govier’s minimal view is offered that makes progress in replying to these challenges.

Finding, Explaining, and Engineering Life
Emily Parke, University of Auckland
 Debates about the definition of “life” have arrived at an impasse. New definitions are being proposed, with no general consensus amongst scientists or philosophers. However, some express skepticism about the possibility of ever arriving at such consensus, or the worth of the whole project of defining life in the first place. This talk re-examines this debate with an eye to the roles that characterizations of life play in scientific practice. In three fields where such a characterization arguably does matter—astrobiology, research on the origin of life, and synthetic biology—these roles range from a target class we’re searching for, a success condition for explaining something, and a success condition for building something. These roles are not mutually exclusive, but which one(s) are at stake in a given context makes a difference to what sort of characterization of life is called for.

Fineness and the Function Argument
Samuel Meister, Brown University
 In recent discussions of Aristotle’s ethics, two themes have been reemphasized which turn out to interweave in interesting ways. The first theme concerns the role the fine plays in Aristotle’s ethics. The second theme is the notorious gap in the function argument in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 between what is the goodness of a human being and what is good for a human being. It has been suggested that Aristotle’s account of fine actions might show us how he meant to close the gap in the function argument. However, so far not enough has been said about how exactly the fine is meant to close the gap. In this paper I will try to remedy that. The key will be to develop a non-egotistic account of the fine on the basis of Rhetoric I.9.

First-order Logic in 13th-Century Accounting Systems
Ronald Fuller, Independent Scholar
 The systems of interconnected books used in double-entry bookkeeping are consistent with the relational model and, therefore, first-order logic. These medieval systems are fully-functional, manually-operated relational database management systems which exhibit quantification and relations with arities greater than 1. Primitive business institutions did not have the benefit of computers but they enjoyed a particular advantage over their modern counterparts: a logic-literate merchant class. When the relational model was introduced in the 1970’s it was falsely seen as a new computer-based way to organize information rather than a new computer-based way to automate reliable logic-based methods used for nearly 700 years. Consequently the responsibility to define logical vocabularies for non-financial information systems was given to computer experts rather than business experts, leading to the widespread proliferation of defective ontologies that fail to meet management expectations. The de-emphasis of logic education since the 19th century is a significant factor in this predicament.

Forgiving, Forgetting, and Un-forgiving
Monique Wonderly, Princeton University
 I begin with a vignette in which an individual who (purportedly) forgave his wife for wronging him later behaves in ways that seem inconsistent with having forgiven her for the relevant act. First, I consider why it is that his attitudes and behaviors seem inconsistent with genuine forgiveness. Next, I raise the possibility that he really did forgive his wife for her transgression, but at some later time, he un-forgave her for it. Though the act of un-forgiving has gone largely unnoticed in the philosophical literature, I argue that it is neither uncommon in everyday life nor is it always improper or unjustified. Like forgiving, un-forgiving can be done for good reasons. Attending to this phenomenon will not only illuminate an important, largely unexplored aspect of moral life, but it will also help to inform extant accounts of forgiveness.

Form and Content in the Zhuangzi: A Fictionalist Perspective
Julianne Chung, University of Louisville
 As many commentators have pointed out, the Zhuangzi is an especially intriguing philosophical text not only because it strikes many readers as at the same time literary, but also because its aesthetic features are plausibly related to its cognitive value in some way. (Cf. Kjellberg and Ivanhoe 1996 and Raphals 1996) Even if this is granted, however, it is unclear as to just how this might be so. This paper explores the possibility that a fictionalist interpretation of the Zhuangzi may prove useful for supplying an account of how the form of the Zhuangzi is related to its content. It also briefly discusses how this interpretation of the Zhuangzi might bring it into constructive conversation with contemporary debates regarding whether and how works of art, and in particular, literature, might be said to have cognitive content.

Free Choice Impossibility Results
Simon Goldstein, Rutgers University
 Free Choice is the principle that “possibly p or q” is equivalent to “possibly p and possibly q.” A variety of recent attempts to validate Free Choice rely on a nonclassical semantics for disjunction, where the meaning of “p or q” is not a set of possible worlds. In this paper, I prove that some kind of nonclassical semantics for disjunction is required in order to validate Free Choice. Given some assumptions about the meaning of “possibly” and the meaning of “and,” there is no way to validate Free Choice while interpreting “or” as any kind of function from two sets of worlds to another set of worlds.

Freedom, Self-prediction, and the Psychology of Time Travel
Alison Fernandes, University of Pittsburgh
 Do time travellers retain their normal abilities when they travel back in time? Lewis, Horwich and Sider argue they do. Time-travelling Tim can kill his young grandfather or even his younger self—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed—but he is just as free as a similar non-time-traveller. But what agents can reasonably deliberate on is sensitive to their beliefs. According to a plausible ignorance condition, agents must be uncertain of what they will do if they are to reasonably deliberate. This creates a rational constraint on the time-traveller’s freedom. Tim can’t reasonably deliberate on killing his grandfather, certain he’ll fail. With this constraint, time-travellers’ abilities to deliberate are significantly curtailed. This constraint makes sense of our competing intuitions about how to evaluate counterfactuals in such cases, and demonstrates how global structure can determine local abilities.

Friendship as a Bridge to the Highest Good
Kiran Bhardwaj, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 Some critics dismiss Kantian ethics because it doesn’t make the right kind of room for intimate attachments. Yet Kant’s discussion of the ideal of friendship may provide Kantians with the resources to respond to these concerns. This paper examines Kate Moran’s interpretation of the duty of friendship, and while largely in favor of her argument, suggests that she has missed two important parts of what the ideal of friendship does. (1) Friendship helps us practice our duty of moral perfection (as Moran indicates) but it also helps us practice our duty of beneficence and (2) that it is an ideal that Kant says is achievable means that it can serve as a bridge to the highest good—a good that is characteristically unachievable.

Gendered Seeing
Katherine Tullmann, Union College
 This paper explores the concept of “gendered seeing:” the capacity to visually perceive another person’s gender. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by examining feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff’s concept of “interpretative horizons,” which highlights the role that one’s social and political identities play in how we understand the world around us. I then apply some work in the philosophy of perception on perceptual learning and the cognitive penetration of perception to gendered seeing. My hypothesis is that we can explain how one’s interpretative horizons are acquired through some notion of perceptual learning. I conclude by suggesting some of the epistemic and ethical implications of gendered seeing.

Genealogy and Jurisprudence in Fichte’s Genetic Deduction of the Categories
G. Anthony Bruno, McGill University
 Fichte says the conclusion of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories is correct, yet lacks a crucial premise given Kant’s admission that the metaphysical deduction locates an ultimately arbitrary origin for the categories. Fichte provides the missing premise by presenting Kant’s philosophy with a new method: a ‘genetic deduction’ of the categories from a first principle. Scholars overestimate or underestimate Fichte’s methodological independence from Kant, assimilating genetic deduction with transcendental deduction or denying genetic deduction is at all transcendental, obscuring Fichte’s innovation. I propose an alternative reading, attributing to genetic deduction the simultaneous fulfillment of two tasks: answering the question quid facti by deriving the categories from a first principle, and answering the question quid juris by establishing our right to the categories as conditions of experience. While the second task represents Fichte’s agreement with Kant’s transcendental deduction, the first reflects his correction of Kant’s metaphysical deduction.

Getting Less Cynical about Moral Motivation
Joshua May, The University of Alabama at Birmingham
 Empirical research seems to reveal that we’re driven largely by morally-irrelevant factors, such as self-interest and transient mood. This suggests that we rarely act for the right reasons, even when we end up doing the right thing. I show that a careful look at the evidence suggests that such sweeping pessimism is unwarranted. Wide-ranging attempts to “defeat” virtuous motivation are subject to a Defeater Dilemma: influences on many morally-relevant actions tend to be either substantial (e.g. guilt, mood, moral reminders) or morally defective (e.g. self-interest, framing effects, implicit bias) but not both. The scientific evidence, therefore, tends to fund only a limited critique of our moral motives.

Getting Near and Going Far: Three Cosmopolitan Strategies for Rethinking the Local and the Global in Aesthetics
Monique Roelofs, Hampshire College
 The notion of the aesthetic encodes expansive visions of cosmopolitan aesthetic agency and cross-cultural interaction. Yet these conceptions exhibit limitations when used to conceptualize concrete aesthetic encounters where gendered and racialized colonial disparities, national linguistic attachments, and routine categorizations or quotidian habits insert blockages between differentially empowered interlocutors or between an aesthetic agent and his visual or readerly access to the global. This essay explores three artistic responses to these conundrums. The first strategy, exemplified by Jamaica Kincaid’s story “Girl,” counters ostensibly edifying precepts with semantic depletion. The second strategy, adopted in Wislawa Szymborska’s poem “Vocabulary,” deploys semantic inflation to wring initially unacknowledged possibilities for cross-cultural interaction from an apparent conversational deadlock. Voiding and replenishment, thirdly, join forces, in a story in Julio Cortázar’s Cronopios and Famas. This essay investigates how these three approaches suggest a decolonial, critical aesthetic that reconfigures the relations between the local and the global.

Giving Place to Democratic Cosmopolitanism: The Foreign-citizen and Hospitality
Jeffrey Epstein, Palomar College
 In this paper, I argue that a democracy that does not open itself to its foreign others demanding hospitality is less a democracy than an ethnic and racial polity, an ethnos masquerading as a demos. While I defend the sovereign right to self-determination, I develop the deconstructive figure of the foreign-citizen that simultaneously upholds the legal and moral importance of democratic citizenship and ceaselessly contests the boundaries of citizenship premised upon the exclusionary logic of the nation-state whereby democratic right and political inclusion is reserved for members of the nation alone.

Grounding Perspectival Facts
Fatema Amijee, University of Texas at Austin
 Many philosophers claim that metaphysical explanation (or grounding) is governed by the following principle: if a fact p metaphysically explains a fact q, then necessarily, if p then q. Call this principle “Necessitation.” The primary goal of this paper is to argue that Necessitation does not hold for all grounding claims, but only a subset of them. In particular, it does not hold when the grounded fact is aspectual or perspectival, but the grounding fact isn’t. I thus show that Necessitation involves an implicit coordinated domain constraint, i.e. the type of value assigned to the first variable in the principle constrains the type of value that can be assigned to the second variable. I motivate this coordination constraint on Necessitation by arguing first for an analogous principle in the temporal framework, and then showing that the conclusions drawn in the temporal case also hold for the modal case.

Grounding the Consequence Argument
Jonah Nagashima, University of California–Riverside
 Incompatibilists think that free will is incompatible with determinism. One prominent argument for this thesis is the Consequence Argument, which utilizes a principle that says “if p is necessarily true, then no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.” While this is initially plausible, recently several philosophers have argued against it. These arguments expose a flaw in the Consequence Argument-as it stands, the argument tries to extract a threat to free will from the entailments that hold in deterministic worlds, but the counterexamples to the principle show that this is the wrong place to look. In reply, I argue that the lesson of the counterexamples is that entailments are neutral to different kinds of grounding relations. Once we shift our focus to metaphysical grounding, we can revise the principle in a way that avoids the counterexamples, and better bring out the force of the Consequence Argument.

Guidance of Visual Attention
Denis Buehler, Oxford University
 A macaque searches some bushes for raspberries. He actively guides his visual attention across the bushes until he finds the berries. When a bright object abruptly appears in the periphery of his field of view, the object captures his attention. His attention then shifts passively. The deepest challenge in action theory, says Harry Frankfurt, is to explain the distinction between processes that an individual guides and processes that occur without an individual’s guidance. In this paper I develop an empirical explication of individuals’ guidance by investigating primates’ guidance of visual attention. Empirical psychology provides extensive evidence that primates have a central executive system that coordinates and integrates psychological states and processes from different modalities and other psychological subsystems. I argue that central executive control (partly) constitutes mammals’ guidance.

How Is the “Chiming Together” of the Rational and the Non-rational Part of the Soul Possible?
Jozef Müller, University of California, Riverside
 I propose to develop a model on the basis of which we could understand the cooperation between the rational and the non-rational part of the soul. The model is that of playing games. I concentrate on deliberation to illustrate its usefulness. Each episode of deliberation has two aspects. The game-like aspect (figuring out the means to a goal) can be made enjoyable by the right sort of upbringing. The non-game-like aspect of deliberation concerns the relation of one’s deliberation to one’s good life. I conclude that moral virtue is the state in which one is habituated to enjoy and engage in reasoning about how to act and in which one forms attachments to the results of one’s deliberative efforts. The central task of moral virtue is to motivate one to deliberate and to make and execute correct decisions. That is why Aristotle defines it as hexis prohairetike.

How Sparse Properties Save Nicod’s Principle
Joseph Vukov, Loyola University Chicago
 Nicod’s Principle says that observations of Fs that are Gs confirm “all Fs are Gs.” As Hempel observed, however, it follows from Nicod’s Principle that the sentence “all ravens are black” is confirmed by my observation of a red rose. Generally, it follows from Nicod’s Principle that my observation of any non-F non-G confirms “all Fs are Gs.” This implication is counterintuitive and counts as a strike against Nicod’s Principle—call the strike Hempel’s Challenge. To meet Hempel’s Challenge, most philosophers have (understandably) developed more sophisticated theories of induction. In this paper, however, I suggest that Hempel’s Challenge can alternatively be met by doing some metaphysics. Specifically, I argue that we can save Nicod’s Principle by scrutinizing our metaphysics of properties, that anyone who endorses a sparse conception of properties gains a principled strategy for resolving Hempel’s Challenge.

How to be a Humean about Non-Humean Dispositions
Marc Johansen, University of Arizona
 Dispositions have traditionally been analyzed in terms of conditionals. For something to be fragile, for instance, is to be such that it would break if struck or, perhaps, break if struck under some more narrowly specified set of conditions. Recently, these conditional analyses have been challenged by a class of counterexamples involving intrinsic masks: cases in which an object possesses both a disposition and some additional feature that prevents that disposition from manifesting itself. This paper introduces an alternative to the conditional analyses that can accommodate such cases. Like conditional analyses, this account ultimately analyzes dispositions away in terms of categorical properties. But it does so via a quite different route. It starts from the non-Humean picture of dispositions as independent sources of causal power or influence.

How to Formulate Physicalism: An Argument for Powers
James Otis, University of Rochester
 Jessica Wilson’s (2005) argument against supervenience-based formulations of physicalism is good, but doesn’t go far enough. I suggest an additional criterion that can transform her argument from a negative critique of one kind of formulation of physicalism into a positive argument against supervenience, grounding, and metaphysical distinctness formulations of physicalism. This new argument favors a powers-based subset formulation of physicalism.

How Well do Cartesian Minds Know Themselves?
Lex Newman, University of Utah
 The backdrop of this paper is Descartes’ Second Meditation thesis that mind is better known than body. My focus is on his further views concerning how well minds know themselves. Standard interpretations attribute two privileged access theses to Descartes: an Infallibility Thesis—we’re incapable of mistakes in our introspective judgments; an Omniscience Thesis—if a mental state is occurring, we’ll know it. On my interpretation, Descartes rejects the Infallibility Thesis. And though he accepts a version of the Omniscience Thesis, this version is compatible with his rejection of infallibility. Commentators typically attribute the privileged access theses to Descartes on two main bases. The first is that he should accept them, because they’re entailed by transparency. The second basis centers on texts. In reply, I argue both that Descartes shouldn’t accept the privileged access theses, and that, on close inspection of the alleged proof texts, he doesn’t.

Iconicity & Representational Structure
Colin McLear, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 I argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what it is for a representation to possess iconic format, perceptual representations cannot be both iconic and have a syntactically heterogeneous structure, such as singular-attributive structure. Iconic representations are syntactically homogenous, while more complex forms of representation, including discursive representation, are syntactically heterogeneous. The claim that perceptual representation is iconic, championed by a number of prominent philosophers and psychologists, conflates, I suggest, iconic representation with topographic or map-like representation, in which icons may play various functional roles, including those of singling out particulars and attributing features to them.

In Praise of (Awkward) Silence: A Critique of Charles Taylor’s Conception of the Dialogical Self
Bradley Warfield, University of South Florida
 Charles Taylor is the first contemporary philosopher to explicitly endorse a conception of the self as dialogical as early as Sources of the Self (1989) and his essay “The Dialogical Self” (1991). In this paper, I argue that while Taylor’s account is mostly plausible, there are nevertheless two significant problems with it. First, he never explicitly recognizes the two types of dialogism operative in his account—what, using Heidegger’s language, I shall refer to as the ontological and the ontic. And second, he mistakenly emphasizes rhythm as a necessary condition of dialogical action when he really should have emphasized attunement instead. This second issue means that Taylor does not recognize, as I think he should, that 1) a conversation can have interlocutory rhythm and still be non-dialogical; and that 2) what seems like an awkward (non-rhythmical) encounter can be dialogical because each interlocutor is attuned to the interlocutory dynamics.

Indeterminism in the Rollback Argument
Meghan Page, Loyola University Maryland
 In his widely discussed paper “Free Will Remains a Mystery,” Peter van Inwagen uses an intuitive thought experiment, known as the rollback argument, to argue that free will and indeterminism are incompatible. Van Inwagen’s argument relies on the assumption that indeterminism implies future events have an objective probability. In this paper, I argue that van Inwagen takes this assumption to be grounded in the nature of indeterminism and exemplified by quantum mechanics. However, indeterminism turns out to be an ambiguous term, and van Inwagen’s thought experiment is structured in such a way that probabilities which arise in quantum mechanics would not arise in the rollback ar- gument. As a result, van Inwagen’s argument fails. On a more general note, this paper also raises serious questions about the definition of indeterminism, and the relationship between indeterminism and objective probability.

Individuating Names
Henry Schiller, University of Texas at Austin
 The purpose of this paper is to give an account of how predicativist theories of proper names should take names to be lexically individuated. I argue that a predicativist naming schema like the one found in (Fara 2015) can be thought of as expressing a relationship between an individual and what Kaplan (1990) calls a “generic name.” Generic names are word types which can be spelled and pronounced in different ways. I thus give a predicativist naming schema which says that a name is true of its bearer iff she stands in the right name-bearing relation to some way of articulating that name. This is presented in my naming schema as a disjunct of ways of articulating that name. I then give a pragmatic explanation of why individuals who on this schema share the same name might not always seem to be picked out by the same name-predicate.

Intellectual Timidity and Servility
Alessandra Tanesini, Cardiff University
 Intellectual servility is a vice opposing proper pride about one’s intellectual achievements. Intellectual timidity is also a vice; it is manifested in a lack of proper concern with esteem. This paper offers an account of the nature of these epistemic vices and details some of the epistemic and ethical harms that flow from them. I argue that servility, which is often the result of suffering humiliation, is a form of damaged self-esteem. It is underpinned by attitudes serving social-adjustive functions and causes ingratiating behaviors. It leads to lack of self-respect and because it damages one’s self-confidence, servility has negative effects on testimonial epistemic practices. Timidity, which is often caused by intimidation, is underpinned by negative attitudes toward the intellectual worth of the self which serve a defensive function. It causes self-silencing and thus impacts negatively on testimonial practices. Like servility it also results in lack of self-respect.

Intentional Identity Revisited
Hsiang-Yun Chen, Academia Sinica
 The phenomenon of intentional identity has long bemused the philosophical communities since Geach (1967) first introduced it. Drawing on Edelberg (2006)’s observation that intentional identity has both intersubjective and intrasubjective versions, I argue that the phenomenon is ubiquitous and much more significant than previously acknowledged. What underlies the problem is responsible for many other well-known puzzles, such as Kripke’s (1979) puzzles about beliefs, and so the need for a proper analysis is eminently pressing. In this paper, I will specify a template for generalizing intentional identity, identify the challenges involved, and argue that positing a level of representational entity in both philosophy of mind and language is a promising way to tackle the problem across the board.

Interpreting the Quantum Mechanics of Cosmology
David Wallace, University of Southern California
 Quantum theory plays an increasingly significant role in contemporary early-universe cosmology, most notably in the inflationary origins of the fluctuation spectrum of the microwave background radiation. I consider the two main strategies for interpreting (as opposed to modifying or supplementing) standard quantum mechanics in the light of cosmology. I argue that the conceptual difficulties of the approaches based around an irreducible role for measurement—already very severe—become intolerable in a cosmological context, whereas the approach based around Everett’s original idea of treating quantum systems as closed systems handles cosmological quantum theory satisfactorily. Contemporary cosmology, which indeed applies standard quantum theory without supplementation or modification, is thus committed—tacitly or explictly—to the Everett interpretation.

Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal
Christian Tarsney, University of Maryland
 In the growing literature on decision-making under moral uncertainty, a number of skeptics have argued that there is an insuperable barrier to rational “hedging” for the risk of moral error, namely the apparent incomparability of moral reasons given by rival theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism. Various general theories of intertheoretic value comparison have been proposed to meet this objection, but each suffers from apparently fatal flaws. In this paper, I propose a more modest approach that aims to identify classes of moral theories that share common principles strong enough to establish bases for intertheoretic comparison. I show that, contra the claims of skeptics, there are often rationally perspicuous grounds for precise, quantitative value comparisons within such classes. In light of this fact, I argue, the existence of some apparent incomparabilities between widely divergent moral theories cannot serve as a general argument against hedging for one’s moral uncertainties.

Introspective Disagreement and Skepticism
Kateryna Samoilova, California State University–Chico
 When looking at the ocean, does the blueness seem to belong to the ocean or to the experience of the ocean? Answering this question involves accessing, or introspecting, our perceptual experience. As simple as the initial question sounds, philosophers disagree about the correct answer to it, which has made some wonder whether our introspection is all that reliable. Indeed, there is room for skeptical doubts about the reliability, or rather unreliability of introspection based on such disagreements. Skepticism of this sort could have devastating consequences for introspection, undermining our reliance on it in everyday circumstances. In this paper, I argue that as initially tempting as introspective skepticism may be, it is not warranted by any actual or even merely possible introspective disagreements. I draw on the existing discussion about epistemic peer disagreement, as well as the recent findings in cognitive science, to support my anti-skeptical conclusion.

Intuitionism and Impredicativity
Mark van Atten, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique and Université Paris 4
 It has often been argued that certain notions in intuitionism are impredicative, and therefore not constructive: negation and implication, induction, the Creating Subject (“Troelstra’s Paradox”). In this talk, I will consider and counter these objections in the light of (what I take to be) specifically Brouwerian views on truth and logic.

Is Experiential Content Propositional?
Bryce Dalbey, University of Texas at Austin
 According to one popular version of Intentionalism, experience is one among many propositional attitudes. Recently, some Intentionalists have challenged the claim that experience has specifically propositional content. This paper is concerned to clarify this debate and argue that experience has non-propositional content. I start by showing that non-propositionalism is not trivially false but is instead a viable and theoretically interesting version of Intentionalism with certain advantages over propositionalism. The second half of the paper is concerned with an argument from perceptual reports for propositionalism (analogous to classic arguments concerning propositional attitudes). I argue that properly understood the semantics of perceptual reports suggest a particular version of non-propositionalism, one on which the content of an experience is an event-type. Last, I briefly consider an argument for propositionalism from the fact that we evaluate experience for success. I show that the way in which we do so actually suggests a non-propositional view.

Is the Canon Choking the Pipeline?
Camisha Russell, Colorado College
 Does what philosophy has been limit what philosophy could be? Though not without difficulty, I believe it is possible for those with PhDs in philosophy to push against the traditional boundaries of the discipline by simply arguing that their work is philosophy because they are trained philosophers. By contrast, expanding the definition of philosophy within undergraduate philosophy departments in order to cultivate a more diverse crop of philosophy majors presents a greater challenge. Few (if any) students would be able to complete the major requirements for a B.A. in philosophy without concluding that it is, at its core, white, male, and decidedly Western. Is it possible to demarcate a discipline of philosophy without these historical orientations? I will suggest that a focus on (reconceived) core subjects like metaphysics, epistemology and value theory could be used to decenter the Western in philosophy, though I remain doubtful that such changes will occur.

Is the International Community a Collective Moral Agent?
Christina Friedlaender, University of Memphis
 In matters of global concern, such as disaster relief or extreme political turmoil, people call upon the international community to respond appropriately. Such claims not only refer to the international community as an agent but also as a moral one worthy of praise or blame for its actions. My focus for this paper is whether the international community constitutes a group agent and whether that agent is a moral one. I argue that under certain conditions the international community could function robustly as a collective agent rather than a mere collection of institutions. My claim here is unique as literature on group agency only concerns groups composed of individual persons. I focus instead on the case of a group composed solely of institutions and explore under what conditions a set of institutions could comprise a collective moral agent.

Is Trump to Blame? When Is a Leader Morally Responsible for a Follower’s Actions?
Eugene Schlossberger, Purdue University Calumet
 Do Donald Trump’s statements about punching make him morally responsible for violence at his rallies? Are anti-abortionists responsible for bombings of abortion clinics? Traditional theories of moral responsibility must answer “no.” This paper employs the first fully developed attributionist theory of moral responsibility (that we are responsible for instantiating features that reveal our world views—our values, attitudes, etc.) to articulate three tests for leaders’ responsibility for followers’ acts: The imprimatur test (leaders are responsible for approving of a follower’s act in one of three ways), the foreseeability test (leaders who can reasonably foresee that their act is likely to result in acts of that kind are responsible for deciding that their act is justifiable despite the risk), and the modeling test (leaders are responsible when, under certain conditions, they model the relevant behavior).

Kant and the Impositionist Thesis
Dante Dauksz, Syracuse University
 According to one prominent interpretation, Kant maintained that the spatial features of appearances are products of the mind arranging aspatial sensations according to innate laws. The strongest support for this interpretation comes from the Inaugural Dissertation. But Kant’s motivations for adopting such a seemingly implausible view have not been explained. This paper will attempt to fill that gap by reconstructing the arguments Kant gave in support of this view. After presenting the evidence for this interpretation, I show that the argument appears in §15 of the Inaugural Dissertation and proceeds in two stages. In the first, Kant argues that the locations of objects in space cannot be given in sensation. In the second, Kant claims that objects cannot enter into spatial relations until they have been arranged in spatial locations. From these claims, Kant inferred that our sensations are non-spatial and that spatial form must be imposed on our sensations.

Kant on Original Synthesis and the Unity of Intuition
Jessica Williams, Stanford University
 There has been growing debate in recent years concerning the source of the unity of space and time as singular, all-encompassing wholes. The question is whether this unity depends on the understanding—either through conceptual or pre-conceptual synthesis—or if this unity is a “brute” non-conceptual given. A number of claims that Kant makes in the Transcendental Deduction support the interpretation that attributes the unity of space and time to synthesis by the understanding. Commentators have argued, however, that the nature of synthetic activity—namely, that it always proceeds from parts to whole—cannot account for the unity of space and time, since Kant explicitly claims that space and time are given as infinite wholes, whose parts, moreover, depend on the metaphysical priority of the whole. In this paper, I challenge the assumption that synthesis always proceeds from parts to whole and explain how synthesis is inherently holistic.

Kant, Hegel, and the Formation of the Philosophical Canon
Daniel Smith, Pennsylvania State University
 This paper uses Peter Park’s recent book Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy to make some suggestions about contemporary attempts to re-think the philosophical canon. After summarizing some of the key findings of Park’s book, it draws three “lessons” that should be of interest to those looking to contest the canon as it exists today. First, I argue that the canon as it exists today is, at least in part, an artifact of 19th century debates that no-one would take seriously today. Second, I argue that the “child of his time” argument is not successful: the Eurocentrism of the canon is the result of a concerted effort on the part of 19th century philosophers. Finally, I distinguish between “revolutionary” and “reformist” approaches to rethinking the canon, and argue in favor of the latter.

Knowability and the Knower
Peter Marton, Clark University
 One standard way of approaching a certain class of semantic paradoxes (as e.g. the Liar or the Knower) is to claim that the crucial sentence in the setup of the paradox is meaningless. To circumvent the usual objections against this strategy,I will introduce and argue for a Moderate Anti-Realist (MAR) approach to truth and meaning, built around the concept of knowability. The MAR approach to truth is motivated by the Church-Fitch Paradox that shows the limits of Naive Antirealism. I will show that this approach partitions propositions into eight classes on the basis of their knowability. The question we will ask is: what content/meaning can be attributed to propositions that are fully unknowable? This question forces us to modify the approach that identifies propositions with the corresponding sets of possible worlds. This modified approach will then be used to analyze one particular paradox, the Knower.

Knowability for Verificationists
Justin Vlasits, University of California, Berkeley
 Fitch’s paradox has been taken as an objection to the classical verificationist theory of meaning put forth by members of the Vienna Circle. How should they respond? I argue that all of the current responses are unacceptable to a verificationist and that there is a better response that can be made on their behalf. I show how a different knowability principle is both better motivated by their discussion and does not have the problematic consequences of the principle that figures in Fitch’s Paradox.

Knowledge as Action and Knowledge in Action
Chienkuo Mi, Soochow University
 Virtue epistemological approaches are typically categorized as virtue reliabilist approaches, according to which virtues are competence-based, or virtue responsibilist approaches, according to which virtues are character-based. I will argue that the former approach takes the concept of “knowledge” as action, while the latter considers the role of “knowledge” in action. There are competences that directly enable the gaining of true beliefs and so promote learning, there are also other competences that allow us to develop further competences. It is through such competences that we learn some of the competences that directly enable the gaining of true beliefs. Skillful reflection is a competence that we learn on the basis of other competences, and it is a competence that can allow us to directly gain true beliefs and to develop further competences.

Lawhood and Calculational Tractability
Isaac Wilhelm, Rutgers University
 According to Lewis’s Best System Account (BSA) of lawhood, laws of nature are theorems of the deductive systems that best balance simplicity and strength. In this paper I present three problems which the BSA faces, I advocate a revised version of the BSA which solves them, and I show how this revised version accounts for the nomological character of special science laws. The revised version adopts a different measure of strength: the strongest systems are those which best balance information content and calculational tractability.

Lessing’s Laocoön as Model for Two Forms of Medium Analysis
Daniel Wack, Knox College
 Lessing’s Laocoön essay identifies painting and poetry as two different methods for exploring a single artistic problematic, namely, the imaginative apprehension of bodies in action. Lessing’s work can serve as a model for medium analysis in two ways. If one abstracts away from the particular 18th century artistic problematic that grips Lessing, one is well positioned to pursue modernist or avant-garde approaches to medium. On the other hand, the 18th century problematic of imaginative action apprehension continues to organize our experience of popular arts. Recognizing the importance of the role the problematics of imaginative action apprehension play in organizing the development of contemporary popular arts allows us to better understand how popular arts are expressive of contemporary practical concerns and possibilities.

Levinas’ Reception of the Mythic
Sasha Shivers, Marist College
 The following paper examines the primacy of the ethical relationship in the works of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas claims that ethics begins with the movement away from the elemental, which is associated with participatory modes of being, including myth. In this sense, Levinas is promoting a “from…to” thesis, where myth is seen as pre-rational and horrific. Nonetheless, myth yet plays a powerful, if fugitive role, within Levinas’ text, mediating the ethical relationship with the Other, a relationship which is portrayed by Levinas mythically.

Living Philosophy in Post-conflict Regions
Christian Hoeckley, Westmont College
 Exploring philosophical issues through highly-charged social issues has the virtue of showing philosophy’s relevance to real concerns. But it can backfire. Students can feel that views closely connected to their identity are threatened, and rush to defend philosophical positions seen as supporting those views, without fully exploring those positions. This paper offers strategies for minimizing the felt threat until students can form judgments on the philosophical issues—the true target of the teaching: connect philosophy to social concerns in societies not their own—concerns that they may discover a strong feelings about, but that are at some distance from their home culture; then slowly make the application to issues in the home culture—after students have explored the relevant philosophical views. Study-abroad contexts can strongly enhance this process, and the paper will discuss the program that forms my context for this strategy.

Locke on Reason, Faith, and Miracles
Shelley Weinberg, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Locke’s religious epistemology has been accused of internal incoherence. Miracles, which justify knowledge via revelation, are defined subjectively. Whether Moses’ rod turning into a serpent is a miracle depends simply on whether I take it to be one, given my individual lack of comprehension how the sensible event could possibly have come about by natural means. But in determining which of two competing “miracles” is genuine Locke appeals to an objective criterion: the mark of a superior power. The objection is that Locke can’t have it both ways. I argue that he can, and that it is not incoherent, for Locke’s natural epistemology, and particularly in this paper his account of an instance of “sensitive” knowledge of the existence of an external object, is structurally analogous.

Mad-dog Variablism
Ethan Nowak, University College London
 Ordinary speaker intuitions about the propositions expressed by demonstrative sentences appear to vary systematically over contexts of utterance; if someone points at a while uttering a demonstrative sentence, people will take her to have said something about a, and if she utters the same sentence while pointing at ß, they will take her to have said something about ß. The classic explanation of this fact involved treating demonstratives as semantically sensitive to context. From the perspective of the compositional semantics, however, there are compelling reasons to represent demonstratives simply as variables. This raises a question—how should we explain the intuitive data? The standard solution is to move context-sensitivity from the semantics to the post-semantics, by saying that contexts of utterance initialize a certain assignment of values to variables. In this paper, I claim that this strategy is unacceptably ad hoc, and I offer a pragmatic alternative.

Manipulation and Constitutive Luck
Taylor Cyr, University of California, Riverside
 In this paper, I argue that considerations pertaining to constitutive luck pose a challenge to historicism—the view an agent’s history (how she came to be a certain way) can make a difference as to whether or not she is morally responsible. The main way that historicists have motivated their view is by appealing to certain cases of manipulation. I argue, however, that since agents can be morally responsible for performing some actions from characters with respect to which they are entirely constitutively lucky, and since there is no relevant difference between these agents and agents who have been manipulated into acting from a character bestowed upon them by their manipulators, we should give up historicism. After presenting this argument, I briefly criticize a rival structuralist alternative and sketch a new structuralist proposal that is shaped by reflection on constitutive luck.

Mental Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience
Adam Elga, Princeton University
Agustin Rayo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Bayesian decision theory assumes that its subjects are perfectly coherent: logically omniscient and able to perfectly access their information. Since imperfect coherence is both rationally permissible and widespread, it is desirable to extend decision theory to accommodate incoherent subjects. New “no-go” proofs show that the rational dispositions of an incoherent subject cannot in general be represented by a single assignment of numerical magnitudes to sentences (whether or not those magnitudes satisfy the probability axioms). Instead, we should attribute to each incoherent subject a family of probability functions, indexed to choice conditions. If, in addition, we impose a “local coherence” condition, we can make good on the thought that rationality requires respecting easy logical entailments but not hard ones. The result is an extension of decision theory that applies to incoherent or fragmented subjects, assimilates into decision theory the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, and applies to cases of “in-between belief.”

Metaphor and Chinese Thinking
Yuan-chieh Yang, University of Alberta
 In this paper, I will examine to what extent we can say that Chinese is a more metaphorical language and how this feature may influence Chinese thinking. The paper will consist of mainly two parts. First, based on Max Black’s theory of metaphor and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory, I will examine the nature of metaphor and explain in what sense a linguistic structure can be a better medium for metaphorical expression and metaphorical thinking. Second, based on research on the syntactical structure of the Chinese language, classical Chinese in particular, I will examine how the linguistic structure of Chinese can be a better medium for metaphorical expression and metaphorical thinking.

Metaphysics Beyond Grounding
Daniel Nolan, University of Notre Dame
 Thinking about metaphysical problems in terms of grounding has its uses, but those uses are limited. I am not a sceptic either about grounding or our ability to make progress on some metaphysical puzzles by invoking it, but I will argue it only has a partial role to play in our metaphysical theories. This paper will discuss three kinds of questions that arise if grounding plays a useful role in our theorizing but we resist grounding imperialism. The first is to look again at the relationship between grounding and the relations that arguably underpin grounding connections: part to whole, determinate to determinable, functional role to realizer, etc. The second is to come up with accounts of how grounding relates to necessity, to explanation, and to parsimony in theory choice. Finally, I will discuss the connection between grounding and the proper aim, or rather aims, of metaphysics.

Metaphysics, Corporeality, and Visuality: A Developmental and Comparative Review of the Discourses on Chinese Ink Painting
Eva Man, Hong Kong Baptist University
 This presentation addresses three main questions: How should we understand Contemporary Chinese ink art and its many possibilities, when we agree that this has a great bearing on how the traditional medium of ink is being internationally recognized? Is there anything essential about ink art? With the controversies on the modernization issues of ink painting, this presentation reviews some of the essentialist views of ink painting discussed in the Chinese tradition, and the observations on new ink art with particular regards to the problems of technique, visuality, and metaphysics. The aesthetical references in the Daoist context will be revisited, with the example of the theories of Shih Tao. The discussion will then be compared and contrasted with Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. The metaphysical beliefs will be emphasized in the comparative revelation when the focus is on the understanding of art, visuality, and corporeality implied in the ink media.

Metric Mereology
Stephen Steward, Syracuse University
 I define physical part-whole relations in terms of distance relations as follows. Metric Theory of Parthood: x is part of y iff nothing is closer to x than to y The left-to-right direction follows from two claims: wholes are where their parts are, and “distance” mean minimal distance. The right-to-left direction follows from Weak Supplementation and the Overlap-Distance Link: x overlaps y iff x is zero distance from y. After arguing for the theory, I consider three kinds of counterexamples: things that touch, or are light-like separated, or co-located. The geometrical approach to mereology can accommodate various geometries and views on contact and co-location. Finally, I argue that the metric theory is an adequate definition of parthood. Since we can define parthood in terms of distance, and we cannot gain the advantages of such a definition in any other way, we ought to define parthood in terms of distance.

Model-based Scientific Explanation and Global Theory
Andrew Wayne, University of Guelph
 Much recent work on scientific explanation focuses on the role of idealized models. The central idea is that idealized models contain elements that do not accurately represent components of the target system itself, yet these non-representational elements may nonetheless be used to explain phenomena or regularities in the target. This paper argues this work largely neglects one essential feature of these explanations, namely the connection between the idealized local model and a broader global theory that itself has independent explanatory power. The paper starts by distinguishing local and global features of explanation in science. Next, it shows that two prominent accounts of model-based explanation overlook or misconstrue the role of global features (Bokulich 2011; Batterman and Rice 2014). It ends with a suggestion about how the connection between global theory and explanatory local models might best be understood.

Moral Ignorance as an Excuse
Paulina Sliwa, University of Cambridge
 There is widespread agreement that non-moral ignorance can excuse. But opinions are sharply divided on whether moral ignorance can excuse. I will argue that moral ignorance is an excuse. My argument proceeds by examining our blaming practices. These practices involve much more than just judgments about individual cases. They encompass how we express and attribute blame, how we seek to deflect it, and how we accept it and express remorse. I argue that these practices suggest that blame is apt only in response to intentional wrongdoing. I then argue that intentional wrongdoing requires moral knowledge. Since the ignorant wrongdoer acts wrongly unintentionally, she has an excuse. Contra Rosen, I argue that this conclusion does not condemn us to far-reaching skepticism about moral responsibility. I end by suggesting that having an excuse is not the same thing as being absolved from moral responsibility.

Moral Purpose and Growth Mindset are Necessary for Positive Youth Development
Hyemin Han, The University of Alabama
 The Values-in-Action (VIA) classification presents 24 character strengths that are closely associated with positive youth development, and could be considered as necessary components for flourishing. Previous psychological studies have demonstrated that the possession of these strengths is significantly associated with adolescents’ subjective well-being. However, as moral philosophers who have critically reviewed positive psychology have argued, these character strengths per se could not be sufficient conditions for flourishing, particularly Eudaimonia in Aristotelian moral philosophy, since they could not be morally appropriate in all instances. In order to address this issue, I propose a “purpose” as a potential guidance for the implementation of the character strengths with findings from moral and developmental psychological studies. As a beyond-the-self motivation, which is related to a moral and prosocial motivation, is a fundamental component of the sense of “purpose,” it might provide a right, morally-justifiable direction to the character strengths.

Moral Torch Fishing: A Signaling Theory of Blame
David Shoemaker, Tulane University of New Orleans
Manuel Vargas, University of San Francisco and University of California, San Diego
 All of the leading theories of blame have to engage in fancy dancing in order to capture prima facie counterexamples to their views. This problem is a result of the fact that they all ignore a crucial aspect of blame, namely, its signaling function. In this paper, we present the problems with the extant theories and then explain what signaling is, why appealing to it resolves the problems, and what the signaling function implies for a wider range of gray-area cases.

Multidimensional Population Ethics
Martin Peterson, Texas A&M University
 The aim of this paper is to work out the implications of multidimensional consequentialism for population ethics. In Parfit’s discussion of population ethics in Reasons and Persons (1984) he admits that none of the theories he considers is morally acceptable. In a series of influential papers and monographs, Ng (1989) and Arrhenius (2000, 2016) generalize Parfit’s conclusion by arguing that no theory of population ethics is consistent with a number of reasonable normative desiderata. They do this by proving a set of formal impossibility theorems. In this paper I show that multidimensional consequentialists can plausibly reject some of the key premises of the most general impossibility theorem proved by Arrhenius.

Names and Titles
Roberta Ballarin, University of British Columbia
 In her recent defense of predicativism, Fara proposes the following non-metalinguistic being-called condition for the applicability of names as predicates: A name “N” is true of a thing if and only if it is called N. Fara also claims that the being-called condition holds for names only. I argue that the word “called” is ambiguous, and that the being-called condition holds only for a particular sense of “calling.” Thus, Fara’s being-called condition needs to be revised. I also argue that being-called conditions are not unique to proper names. Finally, I argue that the non-metalinguistic character of Fara’s being-called condition is only superficial, however this is not a problem given that the metalinguistic version of the being-called condition is not problematically circular.

Natural Normativity in Early Marx
Henry Pickford, Duke University
 The beginning of an account of Aristotelian natural normativity in early Marx is offered here through an examination of the form of generic judgment expressive of such normativity. The first part of the article describes four logical features and metaphysical consequences of the type of judgment in question, and relates the form of judgment to a specific region of Aristotle’s thought with which the early Marx was very familiar. The second part interprets early Marx’s explication of social production in terms of this form of judgment, and suggests that it provides the implicit normative standpoint for a specific kind of critique of capitalism in the 1844 Manuscripts.

Natural Suspicions: What’s Unscientific about the A Priori?
Olin Robus, University of Washington
 Naturalism faces a dilemma: on one hand, it harbors a suspicion of justifications made in the absence of experience or empirical data. On the other hand it yokes itself to science, which includes justifications that outstrip experience. We’ll gain insight into this dilemma by asking why naturalism rejects a priori justification. This paper attempts to identify the reasons for this rejection. The first section considers naturalist rejections of a priori methods. The second section argues naturalism is motivated by a commitment to a picture of knowledge and justification unique to naturalism, one which emphasizes the contingency of our patterns of justification. This leads the naturalist to doubt the epistemic inevitability of any “fixed-point” within the constellation of belief. The third section examines strategies by which the naturalist might eschew the a priori, but leave open the possibility of genuine metaphysical knowledge. I conclude by taking stock of these strategies.

Nomological Contingency and Scientific Essentialism
Benjamin Henke, Washington University in St. Louis
 Scientific Essentialism is the view that the laws of nature are grounded in the dispositional essences of things. Defenders have argued that scientific essentialism entails necessitarianism, the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I argue that necessitarianism has distinct advantages over contingentist accounts, because it is better able to model what I call “nomological contingency.” Where x is a property, kind, or law, “x is nomologically contingent” means that x is contingently instantiated within nomological space. I argue that, unlike necessitarian accounts, neither Regularity Theory as defended by David Lewis nor Nomic Necessitation as defended by David Armstrong—nor natural modifications of those views—can account for instances of nomological contingency. Necessitarianism about laws is not the death knell of Scientific Essentialism.

Non-philosophical Virtue in Plato’s Phaedo
Amos Espeland, Stanford University
 There has been growing interest among Plato scholars in the kinds of virtue accessible by non-philosophers. This topic is also interesting to a broader audience of moral philosophers because it concerns the possibility and nature of virtue in absence of ethical knowledge. In this paper, my primary aim is to argue that the non-philosophical virtue in Phaedo lacks a feature that, from the evidence of later dialogues, we might expect it to have. This oddity of Phaedo results in a radical discontinuity between philosophical and non-philosophical virtue that Plato later appears to reject. A related secondary aim is to identify the kind of motivation that makes up in part non-philosophical virtue. To accomplish this task, I offer criticism of two recent accounts of non-philosophical virtue in Phaedo (Kraut 2010; Vasiliou 2012). I conclude by considering why Plato may have abandoned the discontinuity between philosophical and non-philosophical virtue in later dialogues.

Normative Reflections on Family-based Immigration
Sarah Song, University of California, Berkeley
 Family-based immigration comprises a large (and in some cases, the largest) share of admission for permanent residence in countries in North America and Europe. It regularly comes under criticism by politicians and policymakers who want to their countries to prioritize high-skilled immigration. My paper considers the following normative questions about family-based immigration: What are the reasons for prioritizing family reunification/formation above other claims for admission? How has family been defined for immigration purposes and how should it be defined? What normative dilemmas or tradeoffs does family-based immigration give rise to?

On Losing Belief in Faith
Matthew Frise, Baylor University
 Faith entails belief is the thesis that S’s having faith that p requires, or consists at least partly in, S’s believing that p. Philosophical interest in whether faith entails belief is at its highest. Some philosophers allege that if faith entails belief, then faith is epistemically defective whenever its associated belief is. Others allege that if faith does not entail belief, then faith is easily reconciled with reason. I argue in this paper that these allegations are either mistaken or of less consequence than they appear. I propose two other likely reasons for worrying about whether faith entails belief: the truth-value of the thesis is crucial to the value of faith, and to settling religious membership. I argue that these proposals too are either mistaken or of less consequence than they appear. I conclude that whether faith entails belief has none of the striking outcomes it might seem to have.

On Not Getting Out of Bed
Samuel Asarnow, Macalester College
 This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For this morning my mind was in order; it was my (in)action that apparently made me irrational. After arguing (against John Broome) that cases of execution failure are metaphysically possible, I consider a menu of options for how mentalists can diagnose the relevant irrationality. These include an appeal to conflicting intentions, a requirement of overall conative coherence, and a form of volitionalism. None is obviously attractive, but I specify what work could be done to make each more plausible.

Ontological Hope: A Hard Case for Standard Models of Hope
C.J. Davies, Vanderbilt University
 Prominent analyses of hope assume that hope consists in either a desire for a future situation to come about or a response to a trying situation. Ontological hope, defined as a hope concerning being or what exists, is not properly captured by these analyses. The case of theistic hope can be used to illustrate the lack of fit.

Ontological Methodology and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Critique of Thomas Hofweber
Michael Calasso, University of Minnesota
 In “Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic” Thomas Hofweber seeks to establish that numbers do not exist. This is a two-step process: first, his goal is to show that number words, like “four” and “five,” do not refer; Hofweber calls this thesis “internalism” about arithmetical discourse; second, he applies his ontological principle (REF*), which he takes to be a conceptual truth: let “x” be an expression that may appear in the syntactic position of a singular term; then if “x” does not refer, x does not exist. This principle, in conjunction with internalism about arithmetical discourse, allows Hofweber to conclude that numbers do not exist. In this paper, I present decisive criticisms of Hofweber’s arguments for internalism. I provide a counter-example to (REF*), demonstrating that it cannot be a conceptual truth. I then generalize on this counter-example to show that Hofweber’s ontological methodology is unviable.

Partial Manifestations
Nicky Kroll, Franklin and Marshall College
 There has been a movement, growing over the last twenty years, to treat dispositionality as irreducible and, in turn, offer dispositional account of important metaphysical matters such as causation, the laws of nature, and modality. However, unlike the earlier turn towards possible worlds in metaphysics, the turn towards dispositions hasn’t had much impact in semantics. But this is largely because semanticists have yet to consider what dispositional analyses of (say) tense, aspect, conditionals, generics, or modals would look like. My aim in this paper is to push the movement forward on both the metaphysics and semantics front by taking the first steps towards a dispositional account of events in progress and the progressive aspect.

Philosophy from the Ground Up
Alison Wylie, University of Washington
 This Dewey Lecture will be a reflection on philosophy engaged—with archaeological practice and feminist activism. The “ground” in one case is quite literally the material from which archaeological evidence is prized and sense made of pasts that often challenge settled assumptions about how things have been, how they must be. In the other case it is a grounding in grass-roots activism that brings into sharp focus the predicament of being inescapably situated: the contingencies of epistemic locality and diversity that both limit and enable inquiry. My philosophical trajectory follows that of the practice turn in philosophy generally; I find our field invigorated by an attentiveness to the world as we find it.

Pleasure, Pain, and Emotional Responsiveness in Aristotle’s Ethics
Matthew Cashen, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
 Aristotle distinguishes the virtuous person from the merely continent by how the virtuous person feels when challenged to act well. Consider temptation: the continent person feels the pull of, yet conquers, temptation, while the virtuous is not tempted, for he neither enjoys illicit pleasures nor is he pained at their absence. It thus is a mark of the virtuous that he finds pleasure in acting well. But is the enjoyment of activity all Aristotle has in mind when he connects pleasure with virtue? In this paper I argue that when Aristotle connects pleasure to virtue, he is thinking not just of the pleasures that accompany activity. He is thinking also of the pleasures that partly constitute the emotions (pathe) felt by the virtuous, along with the pains of emotional imbalance that spoil virtue. The connection between virtue and pleasure in Aristotle’s ethics is, I conclude, more complex than commonly assumed.

Practical Identity and Duties to the Self
Paul Schofield, Bates College
 In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces his discussion of duties to the self by mentioning what has been, historically speaking, the most important objection to the notion, which is this: Because any purported duty to the self could be waived by the very person it is meant to bind, the purported duty will necessarily fail to bind in the way that a genuine duty must. In this paper, I propose what I hope is a novel strategy for defending duties to the self. I will argue that a person can occupy multiple perspectives associated with various of her practical identities, and that from these perspectives she can engage in a form of second-personal moral address that generates unwaiveable self-directed duties.

Progressively Realized Human Rights
Jiewuh Song, Seoul National University
 I argue for a novel account of human rights obligations that challenges the traditional divide between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socioeconomic rights, on the other. On this account, if the realization of some human right reasonably requires (a) the appropriate institutional arrangement of socioeconomic resources; (b) in what is typically a gradual process; or (c) what we know is limited, so that some uncertainty about success conditions remains (to be further researched), then the duties and responsibilities corresponding to this right should be understood on the model of progressive realization, regardless of the object of the right. Progressive realization is typically associated with socioeconomic rights, but I argue that distinctions in mode of human rights obligations should be understood to cut across divisions in subject matter. The resulting flexibility in human rights obligations helps us navigate an attractive path between irresponsible intervention and inaction.

Rational Commitment and Knowledge of Intentional Action
Stephen White, Northwestern University
 It is generally agreed that, as agents, our knowledge of our intentional actions is not based solely on observation or other forms of evidence. According to inferentialism, when an agent knows that she is or will be performing an intentional action, X, what she knows without the help of observation or evidence is just that she intends or has decided to X. Assuming relevant background information, she may then be in a position to infer that she will X. By contrast, according to the “practical reasoning view,” an agent’s knowledge of what she does is grounded primarily in the practical reasoning that supports doing it in the first place. I attempt to provide some motivation for the practical reasoning view by arguing that the inferential view is incompatible with an intuitive conception of intention as a form of rational commitment to action.

Realizable Extensions of Brouwer’s Analysis
Joan Rand Moschovakis, Occidental College
 In 1965 Kleene and Vesley developed an axiom system I for intuitionistic analysis as a nonclassical extension of a classically correct system B based on intuitionistic logic. Realizability interpretations established that I is consistent relative to B and that Markov’s Principle, which Brouwer rejected, is independent of I. This talk describes some extensions of I by realizable axioms with interesting, and in some cases surprising, consequences.

Reason’s Path to the Ens Realissimum
Joe Stratmann, University of California–San Diego
 The early Kant advances a possibility argument for the existence of God. In a nutshell, Kant’s argument is that all real possibility must be grounded in something actual, and God is the only actual thing which can ground all real possibility. The critical Kant presents a broadly similar sort of possibility argument in the Transcendental Ideal in order to explain how reason arrives at the idea of the ens realissimum. Unfortunately, this argument is notoriously obscure. I aim to clarify how reason arrives at the idea of the ens realissimum as the ground of real possibility from the sum total of possibility and the idea of the All of reality. I argue that real repugnance plays a crucial role in reason’s move from the idea of the All of reality to the idea of the ens realissimum, just as many maintain that it does in the early Kant’s possibility argument.

Reasons and Responsibility
Hannah Tierney, Cornell University
 Theories of moral responsibility tend to feature only the minimally sufficient threshold conditions for moral responsibility. But these theories cannot account for the scalar practices of praising, blaming, and holding agents morally responsible. Philosophers have responded to this omission by developing accounts of moral responsibility that come in degrees. Justin Coates and Philip Swenson (2012) argue that the degree to which agents are morally responsible for their actions depends on how difficult it is for their actual-sequence mechanisms to react and recognize sufficient reason to do otherwise. Dana Nelkin (2016) argues that the difficulty relevant to scalar moral responsibility is a function of not only agents’ actual-sequence mechanisms but also their circumstances. Both accounts, though innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which we hold agents morally responsible is informed not only by facts about the difficulty these agents face but also by the quality of reasons for which they act.

Reasons for Repugnance
Victor Kumar, University of Toronto
 Moral wrongdoing regularly merits feelings of resentment, indignation, and outrage. But do we ever have reasons to feel disgusted by moral wrongs? Prominent work on this topic by Martha Nussbaum and Dan Kelly suggests that we do not. However, the shortcomings of disgust are no more severe than the shortcomings of other emotions implicated in moral thought. I will argue that we have two different kinds of reasons to feel moral disgust. First, moral disgust is attuned to a sub-class of moral wrongs that includes acts of cheating, dishonesty, and exploitation. Second, due to its original biological function in disease avoidance, moral disgust motivates an important form of punishment—exclusion and ostracism of those who threaten social pollution. Ultimately, I will suggest that understanding the psychological and social functions of disgust lends support to an indirect-consequentialist theory of the fittingness conditions of moral disgust.

Reasons Internalism and the Problem of Depression
Andrew Spaid, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 In Reasons from Within, Alan Goldman attempts to solve a problem for internalist views about reasons. The problem is that internalism seems unable to explain the apparent irrationality of a depressed person’s inactivity. Since internalism claims that one’s reasons are provided only by one’s desires or motivations, internalism cannot explain why a depressed person is irrational when they fail to do things like go to work or take care of their health. Goldman attempts to solve the problem by arguing that, though depressed people lack motivation to perform daily activities, they continue to have deeper, reason-giving desires for things like loving relationships or successful careers. I argue that Goldman’s solution to the problem fails. I present evidence that many people with clinical depression lack the kind of deep desires that, on Goldman’s view, they would need in order for their inactivity to count as irrational.

Reconciling Strong Motive Internalism, Humean Psychology, and the Traditional Realism of Moore and Shafer-Landau
Abraham Graber, University of Texas at San Antonio
 The motive internalist challenge has, historically, constituted one of the most daunting barriers to a cognitivist meta-ethics. While a variety of cognitivist friendly solutions have now been offered, these solutions largely require that one either surrender Humean psychology or give up on the kind of moral semantics endorsed by traditional realists such as Moore, Shafer-Landau, and Enoch. This paper will examine the structure of two familiar complex-concept responses to the motive internalist challenge. Building on the structure of these responses, I will argue that traditional realists like Moore can offer a complex-concept response of their own that can accommodate strong motive internalism and Humean psychology without requiring the traditional realist to modify their account of moral language.

Religious Causation
Jeanine Diller, University of Toledo
 This poster will display graphical models of two divergent expert analyses of the causal history of the September 11, 2001 attacks—Todd Green’s (2015) and the federal 9/11 Commission Report (2004)—with a focus on these texts’ interpretations of Islam’s putative role in the attacks. The models are produced by deploying a method I developed that combines work in the philosophy of causation (e.g., David Lewis 1973, 2000, Christopher Hitchcock 2015) with research in the sociology of religion (e.g., Christian Smith 1996) to identify whether religion is at work in causing an event and, when it is, what about a religion, exactly, combines with other factors such as ethnicity, nationalism, economics, etc., to do the causing.

Responsibility and the Shallow Self
Samuel Reis-Dennis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 Contemporary philosophers of moral responsibility are in widespread agreement that we can only be blamed for actions that express, reflect, or disclose something about us or the quality of our wills. In this paper I reject that thesis and argue that self disclosure is not a necessary condition on moral responsibility and blameworthiness: reactive responses ranging from aretaic appraisals all the way to outbursts of anger and resentment can be morally justified even when the blamed agent’s action expresses or discloses nothing significant about his or her “deep self,” judgments and cares, or the quality of his or her will. I argue that the self-disclosure requirement on responsibility overestimates the extent to which our blaming practices and responsibility judgments are responsive to agents as opposed to actions, and that this mistake has the potential to distort both our reactive responses and our understanding of blamed agents’ characters.

Rethinking Type-A Materialism
Bénédicte Veillet, University of Michigan-Flint
 The general consensus is that there are two main materialist strategies for dealing with the Epistemic Arguments against materialism (e.g. the Knowledge Argument): type-A and type-B materialism. The difference between the positions is supposed to be roughly this: type-A materialism denies the epistemic observations at the heart of the Epistemic Arguments; type-B materialism takes those epistemic observations at face value, challenging instead the inference from these epistemic observations to dualism. I argue that the distinction between type-A and type-B materialism is not actually as sharp as it seems: a closer look at the epistemic observations in question reveals that there is plenty of room for materialisms that incorporate elements of both type-A and type-B materialism. Moreover, I argue that type-B materialism might be unstable, most importantly because it threatens to collapse into type-A materialism.

Retributivists! The Harm Principle is not for You!
Patrick Tomlin, University of Reading
 This paper has been awarded the Berger Memorial Prize 2017, and is already published ( Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should endorse the criminalization of conduct that is either purely self-harming or good for somebody and bad for nobody (i.e., Pareto improvements).

Revenge Is Sweet
Joshua Gert, College of William and Mary
 This paper defends the claim that getting revenge is good for the person who gets it, even when it is not morally justified. It briefly addresses two arguments that revenge is not itself a personal good: that it serves no legitimate purpose, and that its pursuit is really the pursuit of a feeling of satisfaction. In favor of the goodness of revenge it makes a Millian appeal to the evidence of widespread human desire. It also points out that we do not regard the desire for revenge as irrational, since doing so would always at least partially mitigate moral responsibility for acts of vengeance. Revenge also provides the basis for ‘categorical desires’: those that can provide meaning to a life, and a motivation to stay alive to pursue them. A final argument points out that even those who would never act on their vengeful desires nevertheless engage in revenge fantasies.

Reverse Sobel Sequences and Why Most Counterfactuals are Not True
Yael Loewenstein, University of Arizona
 The problem of reverse Sobel sequences is considered to be an important objection to the classic Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals. Responses to the problem have been wide-ranging. It is my contention that none of the extant solutions to the problem are correct. After showing why I think each is wrong, I defend a novel way to make sense of the sequences. The solution I endorse avoids the problems faced by the alternative analyses. In addition, there is good independent reason to think that it is right. There is, however, a difficulty for my view: its truth entails that many ordinarily accepted counterfactuals are not true. I argue that this (apparent) cost is an entirely acceptable one.

Science and the Challenges of Epistemic Trustworthiness: A Situated Approach
Heidi Grasswick, Middlebury College
 Social epistemologists and science studies scholars alike have emphasized the important epistemic role of placing one’s trust in experts, including scientific experts. Feminist and critical race theorists have argued that groups who have suffered histories of poor epistemic and ethical relations with scientific communities and related institutions can have good reasons to distrust scientists and their claims in certain contexts, in turn threatening the possibilities for fruitful relationships of trust and trustworthiness. Building on such work, this paper outlines a “situated approach” to epistemic trust and trustworthiness that takes seriously the role of social position and epistemic context in grounding degrees of trust and trustworthiness. It discusses both the demands and challenges of developing strong relations of trust and trustworthiness between scientific communities and differently situated “lay” communities.

Scientific Depravity and Ontological Commitment
Daniel Padgett, Northwest Vista College
 This paper considers two questions. First, what are the ontological commitments of scientific realism? Second, what does the answer to the first question tell us about doing physics-based (or, more generally, science-based) metaphysics? The standard answer to the first question is that the scientific realist is ontologically committed to whatever entities are in our best scientific models. The assumed answer to the second question is that, if we are ontologically committed to our best models, we are free to employ truths about those models when articulating metaphysical arguments. I argue that the standard answer to the first question needs to be clarified-but that once we do that the only interesting claims that we can defend are not based on science but on metaphysics. Thus, contrary to the assumed answer to the second question, we are not free to make use of our best science when offering metaphysical arguments.

Scientific Realism and the Quantum
Valia Allori, Northern Illinois University
 In this paper I connect the debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave-function to the debate in the philosophy of science on scientific realism. According to the wave-function ontology approach, the wave-function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave-function does not represent matter. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called “explanationism” realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. One could therefore conclude that: (1) contrarily to what commonly though, explanationism realism can be extended to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave-function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument.

Self-control and Overcontrol: Conceptual, Ethical, and Ideological Issues in Positive Psychology
Michael S. Brownstein, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
 In what they call their “manual of the sanities”—a positive psychology handbook describing contemporary research on strengths of character—Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman argue that “there is no true disadvantage of having too much self-control.” This claim is widely endorsed in the research literature. I argue that it is false. First, it is not clear what researchers mean by “self-control” in this context. Second, there do appear to be downsides to being overcontrolled. Third, there is an ideological undercurrent to the unequivocal promotion of self-control.

Self-control and Rationality
Paul Weirich, University of Missouri
 Self-control sometimes seems to require not doing what one most wants to do. Does rational self-control ever violate decision theory’s requirement of utility maximization? This paper presents brief accounts of rationality and self-control, and reviews decision theory’s standard of utility maximization. Then it considers cases in which rational self-control appears to block utility maximization and argues that in each case no violation of decision theory’s standard of utility maximization occurs. The cases involve self-control in executing a plan and turn on whether a plan is rational only if it maximizes utility and whether executing a step in a plan is rational if the plan is rational. The paper answers, no, to both questions and argues that execution of a plan is rational if execution of each step is rational and that, if the steps resolve standard decision problems, each step is rational only if it maximizes utility.

Self-knowledge and Cognitive Phenomenology
Andre Martin, McGill University
 In a recent article Joe Levine (2011) evaluates some common arguments that have been given for the existence of cognitive phenomenology (CP) and concludes that these arguments give you, at most, the existence of “conservative” or “impure” CP. Liberalism about CP, in contrast, is the view that there’s something it’s like to cognize (e.g., in understanding a sentence) and that these phenomenal experiences don’t reduce to non-controversial sensory phenomenology. In this paper I evaluate, in particular, Levine’s account of the “self-knowledge argument” for CP and his conservative conclusion. I argue that this argument should, if anything, commit Levine to liberalism about CP. I take this to be a dialectically important conclusion given that Levine starts from a neutral standpoint, unlike many others in the CP debate who either think the existence of CP is obvious or who deny CP given a commitment to a standard form of functionalism.

Sentimentalism & the Nature of Moral Concepts
John Jung Park, Clemson University
 Jesse Prinz adopts sentimentalism, which will be understood here as the view that all moral concepts in genuine moral judgments are constituted by sentiments and at times by emotions (2007, 2015). In this paper, I criticize Prinz’s most recent a posteriori contention for sentimentalism (2015). Next, I develop a new functionalist method that can be the basis for empirically determining whether or not sentimentalism is true. I contend that this methodology provides a more firm ground for Prinz’s argument for sentimentalism.

Skill, Know-how, and the Arts
Julianne Chung, University of Louisville
 In this paper, I argue that the cognitive value of art can be explicated, at least in part, in terms of the capacity of certain works of art to cultivate important varieties of both skill and know-how, applicable to a broad spectrum of, e.g., extra-fictional situations, via imaginative perspective-taking. I then explain how this account resolves a number of tensions between common ways of thinking about the purpose and value of art and has the virtue of showing that distinctly aesthetic features of works of art are indispensable to their cognitive value. What is exceptionally surprising, however, is that this unified account turns out to be compatible in principle with certain traditional views’ commitment to the claim that works of art—insofar as they have cognitive value of a meaningful sort—yield “worldly” propositional knowledge.

Small (Expected) Harms and Small (Expected) Improvements
Avram Hiller, Portland State University
 A number of philosophers have argued that greenhouse gas emissions from ordinary individual activities are so minuscule that they make no moral difference whatsoever. This argument bears important similarities to what is known as the small improvements argument, according to which there are cases where a small expected improvement in an option makes no difference in its choiceworthiness compared to another option, and thus the two options are (in Ruth Chang’s terminology) on a par. In this paper, I offer a unified response to the two arguments that upholds value completeness. Such cases, I argue, are ones where individuals employ heuristics in assigning both subjective probabilities and values to outcomes, and a small change in the decision context makes no difference at all regarding which heuristic is used. This use of heuristics is rationally appropriate, at least in some of the relevant cases.

Social Epistemic Logic
Fenrong Liu, Tsinghua University
 In this talk I will argue why adding a social dimension to current epistemic logic is essential to understanding informative communication in structured groups of agents. A new system of two-dimensional social epistemic logic is introduced for this purpose that can be used to analyze individual and group knowledge in the presence of communication channels. We establish meta-properties of this system such as completeness. I then extend the system to a dynamic logic with laws for changes in both the epistemic and social dimensions, two key phenomena in significant social scenarios.

Spontaneous Loss of Parts and the Grounding Problem
Amir Arturo Javier-Castellanos, Syracuse University
 I argue that, wherever there’s a dog, there are countless objects exactly like it except that they spontaneously lose some part that the dog keeps—I call them “shrinking objects.” My argument is that the series of particle collections that would successively compose a shrinking object has all that it takes, intrinsically, to compose an object over time. Since whether diachronic composition occurs cannot depend on extrinsic facts, this series does in fact compose. Shrinking objects raise an especially difficult instance of the grounding problem. Suppose a shrinking version of my dog loses a certain particle that another one keeps. How come only one will lose it given that the other one is exactly alike down to the last atom and subject to the same forces? Unlike the more famous case of David and Lump, this case cannot be handled by appeal to the persistence conditions of the objects involved.

Stereotype Threat and Epistemic Injustice
Amandine Catala, Université du Québec à Montréal
 Stereotype threat is the phenomenon whereby one’s awareness of a stereotype regarding one’s social group’s ability in a particular domain (women or blacks are bad at math) results in one’s underperformance in the relevant domain (math). In this paper, I analyze stereotype threat through the lens of epistemic injustice. I show that this analysis provides a more comprehensive normative understanding of both stereotype threat and epistemic injustice. Specifically, my analysis of stereotype threat contributes to the conceptualization of epistemic injustice by identifying a new category of epistemic injustice, thereby expanding its taxonomy. Moreover, unlike most accounts of stereotype threat, my analysis reveals that stereotype threat is not solely an individual or psychological problem, but more fundamentally a structural one.

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense
Jackson Kernion, University of California–Berkeley
 According to a widely held view, we have two separate ways of thinking about “consciousness.” We can think of “conscious” mental states as “experiency”—as feeling a certain way or as having certain qualitative aspects-or we can think of “conscious” mental states in a functional way—as being available for arbitrary use. Importantly, these are conceptually distinct in the sense that we can’t simply reflect on the concepts involved to learn about how they do/don’t actually overlap. But I think we have good reason to reject this view: we cannot conceive of an experience that is functionally isolated from—and therefore unavailable to—the subject for whom it is an experience. If this is right, it looks like the experiency and functional senses of consciousness aren’t totally distinct after all, since it suggests that there are a priori functional constraints on experience.

Student-initiated Civic Engagement Projects
Sierra Barnes, Independent Scholar
Ramona Ilea, Pacific University
 In this poster, we will share our work in implementing and assessing student-initiated civic engagement projects in philosophy classes. These projects provide students with opportunities to be active in their communities through advocacy, initiative, networking, and relationship building. Formal assessment of students’ work on these projects over the years has provided evidence for the value added to the academic and personal lives of the students; students have reported improvements in philosophical understandings, time management, and problem solving.

Substance Over Style: Re-conceptualizing the Social and Environmental Dimensions of the Triple Bottom Line
Robert Cardy, Independent Scholar
Pepe Lee Chang, University of Texas at San Antonio
 We argue that social and environmental duties and/or objectives should not be satisfied in the same manner as duties to owners/stockholders. To do so would be to distort the goals of the social and environmental dimensions (Jamali, 2006) of CSR. We argue for an alternative model that better represents the goals of the social and environmental dimensions of CSR. We will begin by providing a brief description of the triple bottom line as a means to achieving CSR. Next we will attempt to isolate some of the main objectives for each pillar of the triple bottom line. We will then argue that the triple bottom line model distorts the objectives of the social and environmental dimensions (Jamali, 2006) of CSR. Consequently, positioning social and environmental dimensions as part of a triple bottom line would be a mistake.

Supporting Intimates on Faith
George Tsai, University of Hawaii at Manoa
 What is the role of faith in the familiar practice of supporting intimates in their personal projects? Is there anything distinctly valuable about such faith-based support? To explore these questions, I draw on Philip Pettit’s notion of “modally demanding values” and Lara Buchak’s account of faith. In particular, I argue that the virtue of being supportive—a characteristic possessed by the good friend or lover—involves a distinctive kind of faith: faith in another persons’ chosen self-expressive pursuit(s). Such faith-based support, I argue, (1) enables the supported party to enjoy a more meaningful and autonomous exercise of agency in self-expressive arenas, and (2) engenders a sense of relational unity or solidarity, deepening the normative and emotional bonds of the relationship.

Talking about Appearances
Rachel Rudolph, University of California, Berkeley
 Puzzling patterns of disagreement and retraction have been used to motivate relativist semantic analyses for predicates of personal taste (e.g. “tasty,” “fun”). I show that these types of data—so-called “faultless disagreement,” as well as what I’ll call “faultless retraction”—arise equally with another class of predicates that has so far gone undiscussed in the literature: namely predicates we use to talk about appearances, like how things look, taste, sound, smell, and feel. (Examples of these are “looks blue” and “tastes vegan.”) Thus, if truth about matters of personal taste is relative, then so is truth about appearances. This is significant for the semantic debates about taste predicates and other expressions, since it helps us identify the source and range of relativist effects.

Technique-driven Research: Clarifying the Nature of Exploratory Experimentation
David Colaco, University of Pittsburgh
 In this paper, I present an account of technique-driven scientific research, and illustrate its exploratory character. I draw from current research in biological imaging, and focus specifically on the preparation technique known as “clarity.” I describe how this technique has driven contemporary research in the life sciences. From this, I distill two conditions of technique-driven research, which capture the placement of the technique and its influence. With these conditions presented, I illustrate how this kind of research is exploratory in nature, albeit in a way that is unlike previous philosophical accounts of exploratory experimentation. I conclude with a presentation of some characteristics to improve our understanding of what makes experimentation exploratory.

The “Philosophical Problems” Problem, and How to Solve It
James John, University of Toronto
 Philosophy is rife with controversy: there are few philosophical topics on which there is a general consensus in the field. This creates a dilemma for instructors. We want our students to understand all sides of the issues. But when students realize that for every powerful argument offered for a position there is usually another powerful argument against that position, they can become cynically complacent or rashly skeptical or even intellectually demoralized. Result: our efforts to inform our students risk converting them to a pernicious “inquiry skepticism.” I call this the “Philosophical Problems” Problem because it typically arises in introductory courses like my first-year Introduction to Philosophical Problems (though it can strike in any course). My poster explains the problem and defends, using my pedagogical practice in Intro as an example, my approach to dealing with it. Issues addressed: the psychology of disagreement; instructor neutrality/disclosure; intellectual virtues; controversy and inclusivity.

The Aesthetic Quarrel Between Hume and Rousseau
Joseph Tinguely, University of South Dakota
 Rousseau and Hume were engaged in a debate over the nature of language, perception, and affectivity. This chapter of the quarrel between Rousseau and Hume has been overlooked in the literature but can be located in a close comparison of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origins of Languages and Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion. In addition to reconstructing the argument between them, I indicate that the philosophical stakes of the debate concern whether one can be responsible for what he or she perceives.

The Audience in Shame
Stephen Bero, University of Southern California
 Many experiences of shame, like Adam and Eve’s in their nakedness, centrally involve exposure to an audience. This has suggested to many writers that shame essentially involves being exposed to the view or more generally to the appraisal of others—call this the Audience Thesis. Others reject the Audience Thesis on the basis of private experiences of shame that involve no exposure. Both camps face significant difficulties that pose an obstacle to further theorizing about shame. I develop these difficulties and then offer a way to resolve them, arguing that we can capture what is intuitive and correct in the Audience Thesis while also accounting for experiences of private shame. The way out of the impasse, I propose, is to understand shame as a kind of second-order appraisal—an appraisal of appraisals of the subject of shame—and to attend carefully to what this means for the structure of shame.

The Commensurability of Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Jeremy Kirby, Albion College
 It has been argued, on the one hand, that Aristotle lacks an effective way of applying the pros hen method, when it comes to ways of being (Shields 2012, 1999). On the other, it has been argued that Aristotle cannot consistently apply the pros hen method to ways of being (Shields 1999). It is this latter argument to which I here respond.

The Common Present in a Block Universe
Yuri Balashov, University of Georgia
 Our present experiences are strikingly different from past and future ones in being exclusively “available” to us. Every philosophy of time must explain these data. It has long been argued that A-theorists can do it better than B-theorists because their explanation is most natural and straightforward: present experiences appear to be special because they are special. I do not wish to dispute one aspect of this advantage. But I contend that the general perception of this debate is seriously incomplete as it tends to conflate two rather different aspects of the phenomenon behind it, the individual and the common dimensions of the experienced present. When they are carefully distinguished and the emerging costs of the A-theories are balanced against their benefits, the advantage disappears.

The Confucian Puzzle: Care and Justice in Aquinas
Audra Goodnight, Saint Louis University
 Ethical theories of justice and care are often presented in opposition to each other. Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s moral theory has the resources to bring justice and care together. There is, however, a potential worry for her view raised by the “Confucian Puzzle.” The puzzle poses a moral dilemma between care and justice that serves as a test case for Stump’s picture. This paper explores how Aquinas might respond to this moral dilemma in order to assess Stump’s argument for the integration of care and justice in Thomistic ethics. I argue that Aquinas has the resources to integrate justice and care more deeply than Stump proposes through his unifying virtue of charity.

The Counterfactuals of Causation
Carsten Held, Universität Erfurt
 Hume defined causation in terms of a counterfactual. I sketch an alternative: derive causal claims and the pertaining counterfactuals from a common source, a certain condition relation. Using assumptions about truthmakers, I define the relation of a necessary and sufficient (n.a.s.) condition. If P and Q are propositions and ‘p’ and ‘q’ name their truthmakers, we may define: that P is a n.a.s. condition of q iff the existence, resp. non-existence, of a truthmaker of P entails the existence, resp. non-existence, of q. We can now define causation in terms of a n.a.s. condition and derive which counterfactuals are true, when a n.a.s. condition claim is true. I apply these definitions to four cases exemplifying well-known problems in the theory of causation: preemption, trumping, omission, and transitivity. In all cases, I derive plausible causal claims and counterfactuals from a n.a.s. condition.

The Good in the Pursuit of the Bad
Gwen Bradford, Rice University
 When is it good to pursue the bad? A deeply plausible axiological principle, the principle of Recursion (or the amare bonum bonus), holds that it is good to pursue the good and bad to pursue the bad. On the other hand, according to the very plausible Process Thesis of the value of achievements, the process (in addition to the product) is a source of intrinsic value of an achievement. Evil achievements present a tension between Recursion and the Process Thesis: pursuit of an evil goal is bad, yet the process of an achievement is a source of positive value, making the process of evil achievements both good and bad. Fictional evil goals and fictional good goals, as one might pursue in art or games, present further puzzles still. These puzzles present opportunity to explore the best way to understand Recursion as a matter of organic unity.

The Influence of Ignorance on Evidence
Masahiro Yamada, Claremont Graduate University
 On certain familiar ways of thinking about belief revision, differences in prior bodies of evidence do not matter if they give rise to the same prior credence distributions. Conditionalization is a particularly prominent rule of this kind. I argue that while updating in accordance with Conditionalization is acceptable if the prior credence distribution is determined by prior evidence, in cases where something like the principle of indifference must be appealed to for lack of evidence, Conditionalization is not always defensible. The trouble for Conditionalization is that it relies on a preservation of reasons for particular ratios between credence values. If lack of evidence was the reason for a particular ratio, new evidence can remove that reason. This point shows more generally that it cannot be right that differences in prior bodies of evidence do not matter if they do not lead to different prior credence distributions.

The Limits of Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude (and its Conceptual Neighbors)
Joshua Spencer, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
 Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, for nearly any property, F, F is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because F is instantiated. Any property that could be had essentially is an essentializable property and any property that is had essentially is an essentialized property. Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude explains what it is in virtue of which a property is essentialized, but the explanation is empty without at least a partial characterization of which properties are essentializable; a partial characterization, that is, that verifies the antecedent condition that nearly every property is essentializable. Unfortunately, there are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, these obstacles threaten other views in the conceptual neighborhood such as Counterpart Theoretic Plenitude and Conceptualist Plenitude.

The Logic of the Chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s Early Philosophy
Robin Muller, California State University–Northridge
 Discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s scholarly output often suppose that his earliest published work, The Structure of Behavior, presents a philosophy of psychology that is abandoned, first in favor of phenomenology, then of ontology. Moreover, many scholars also view the unfinished text of The Visible and the Invisible as an aberration. This paper challenges both of these positions. It offers a unified account of Merleau-Ponty’s work by arguing that the logic of the “chiasm” and the concept of “flesh,” both characteristic of the late ontology, are already implicit in the earliest work. Through a close reading of Merleau-Ponty’s engagements, in SB, with Gestalt psychology, I show (1) that the account of mind he develops there is carnal and reversible, and (2) that it depends on an ontology that evolves coherently into the concept of flesh. This reading helps to fuse Merleau-Ponty’s empirical projects with his phenomenological and ontological ones.

The Meta-question About Life
Mark Bedau, Reed College
 The question how to define life is very controversial, with no signs of any emerging consensus. This raises the meta-question about life: Why is the definition of life so difficult and so controversial? Proposed answers to the meta-question include observing too few examples of life (Sterelny, Cleland), confusion over homonyms that share a core meaning (Shields), not recognizing impossible to answer question about folk concepts and pointless questions about scientific concepts (Machery), or mistaking human kinds for natural kinds (Keller). Discussions of defining life and its controversies often take a Cartesian perspective and focus on whether identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for individual living organism. This contrasts with an Aristotelian perspective focused on finding the best explanation of life’s hallmarks, borderline cases, and characteristic puzzles. Replacing the Cartesian perspective with the Aristotelian perspective provides promise for answering the meta-question about life, and thereby eventually resolving how to define it.

The Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism
David Glick, Oxford University
 Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? I consider one promising answer: a metaphysical framework called Generalism (Dasgupta (2009; 2016)). According to the Generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that Generalism is inadequate as an explication of OSR. As a version of structural realism, OSR requires making a concession to the antirealist to make sense of theory change. A Generalist metaphysics does no better than traditional realism with respect to this requirement, and may even do worse. Instead, I advocate understanding OSR as a meta-metaphysical thesis that challenges the accuracy of any metaphysical picture of the world.

The Moral Stakes of Distrust
Jason D’Cruz, University at Albany and Université de Montréal
 I critique a recent account of distrust as the confident belief that another person will act unjustly (Krishnamurthy 2015), and I advance my own account of distrust as the refusal to entrust a good. I maintain that the refusal to entrust that is constitutive of distrust is grounded two distinct sources: skepticism about competence, and skepticism about goodwill. In the final section of the paper, I give an account of the peculiar insult of being unjustly distrusted, and I describe the moral significance of such insults. I suggest that the “stakes” of distrust give us moral reason to abjure distrust.

The Nature and Significance of Acquaintance
Samuel Taylor, Auburn University
 Acquaintance theories of justification have fallen on hard times. Often times any appeal to acquaintance will be swiftly dismissed on account of a vague idea that such a relation is “mysterious.” Such an impression has only been magnified by those who insist that such a relation is primitive and sui generic. In this paper I consider the possibility of giving an informative account of the nature of acquaintance. I review an reject epistemic and phenomenological accounts of acquaintance. However, my rejection of the latter account eventually leads me to an account of acquaintance as the availability of a mental state for selection by attention mechanisms.

The Possibility of De-extinction
Matthew H. Slater, Bucknell University
 A number of influential biologists are currently pursuing efforts to restore previously extinct species. But for decades, philosophers of biology have regarded “de-extinction” as conceptually incoherent. Once a species is gone, it is gone forever. I ague that a range of metaphysical and biological grounds for opposing de-extinction are at best inconclusive and that a pragmatic stance that allows for its possibility is more appealing.

The Precisificationist Model of Metaphysical Indeterminacy: A Critique
David E. Taylor, University of Minnesota
 A case of indeterminacy as to whether p is metaphysical (as opposed to semantic) iff it obtains independently of how/if we represent matters p. The standard way of modeling metaphysical indeterminacy (m-indeterminacy) is what I call the precisificationist model (PM). Prominent versions of PM have been developed by Akiba (2004) and Barnes and Williams (2011). I argue that PM is inadequate as a model of m-indeterminacy: There is an entire class of examples of indeterminacy, characterized by a common “branching” structure, that simply cannot be modeled in the way PM proposes. Many of these examples, moreover, are ones which seem metaphysical in nature. So PM cannot be applied to a wide range of cases it’s designed to model and is thus inadequate as an account of m-indeterminacy. During the paper, I demonstrate this conclusion on two specific examples—indeterminate personal identity and indeterminate reference—showing how PM can model neither.

The Real Reason Kant Provides the “Wrong Kind of Reason” for Valuing Animals
Levi Tenen, Indiana University Bloomington
 Kant holds that we should feel gratitude towards non-rational animals who have worked for us because, if we don’t, we “gradually uproot a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other men.” Although Kant justifies feeling the right attitude towards service animals, many commentators think he does so using the wrong kind of reason. I investigate why Kant’s justification is of the wrong sort. Some people worry that Kant’s justification rests on a fragile connection between animals and our predispositions. Others worry that Kant’s justification is not about the animals. I argue that neither account of the “wrong reason objection” facing Kant are successful. I end by drawing from a discussion in metaethics and epistemology on “wrong reasons” to suggest that Kant’s justification is of the wrong kind because it cannot lead us, via reason-guided processes, to feel gratitude towards animals.

The Reference of Proper Names, Testing Usage, and Intuitions
Michael Devitt, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Nic Porot, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 Experiments on reference almost all test theories against referential intuitions. Martí (2009) and Devitt (2011) argue that theories should rather be tested against linguistic usage. This paper has four aims. Substantive aim (I): to test classical description theories of proper names against usage by “elicited production.” Our results count overwhelmingly against those theories. Substantive aim (II): to test those theories by “truth-value judgments.” Results again count against. Methodological aim (I): In response to Martí, Machery et al (2009) conducted a truth-value judgment test that they claimed tested usage. Martí (2014) disagreed. We argue that Machery et al are right and offer some experimental support for that conclusion. Methodological Aim (II): to test the reliability of the folk’s referential intuitions by comparing them with the results of our tests of usage. Past tests led us to predict that we would find those intuitions unreliable. Surprisingly, that is not what we found.

The Refutation of Meaning
Vida Yao, Rice University
 In Bernard Williams’ “Moral Luck,” he draws a distinction between two ways in which one’s personal projects can fail. When one’s project fails “extrinsically,” the project and the meaning of one’s life are what he calls “negated.” In cases where one’s project fails “intrinsically,” one’s project and the meaning of one’s life are what he calls “refuted.” As I’ll argue, while a person is responsible for one’s refuted projects in an important sense, one is not morally responsible, at least on standard understandings of moral responsibility. However, that one is not morally responsible for what has happened cannot (and in some sense, should not) provide the sort of solace that one may need to go on in the face of bankrupting one’s own projects. I will then show how this conclusion provides content to one of Williams’s objections to modern moral philosophy: its evasiveness in handling certain kinds of horrors.

The Resonance Constraint
Chris Heathwood, University of Colorado Boulder
 Internalism about well-being, or the “resonance constraint,” asserts a necessary connection between the things that are fundamentally intrinsically good for some subject of welfare and positive attitudes on the part of that subject. I hope to accomplish two goals on this topic. First, I don’t believe that the doctrine has ever been properly formulated. I aim to remedy that by clarifying what sort of attitude should feature in the doctrine as well as the nature of the relation between the attitude and the good. Second, I explain why it seems that if the resonance constraint is true, then in all likelihood a related doctrine about differences in well-being is also true: if the good must resonate, then the better must resonate more. This is important because whereas the resonance constraint rules out objective theories of well-being, this second doctrine rules out hybrid theories as well.

The Reverberating Impacts of Motivated Reasoning-lite
Jonathan Ellis, University of California, Santa Cruz
 In recent years, there has been growing philosophical interest in the significance of motivated reasoning, including in the reasoning of philosophers. In this paper, I underscore a kind of motivated reasoning that is rarely discussed. In the examples typically offered, a person’s evidence warrants a belief that p, yet the person’s motive (desire, goal, etc.) leads her to believe that not-p. In contrast, I focus here on cases in which the relevant motive leads the thinker not to believe not-p, but to believe p with greater confidence than is warranted. I call this motivated reasoning lite (MR-Lite). Attention to MR-Lite is critical because, as I will argue: (1) MR-Lite is rife and ubiquitous, including among intelligent, reflective and well-meaning individuals; (2) the epistemic ramifications of MR-Lite are surreptitious and substantial. I conclude by discussing two broad implications of these epistemic consequences, one in epistemology, the other in ethics.

The Scope of Consent
Tom Dougherty, University of Cambridge
 Someone’s act of consent waives only some of her rights. Call these the normative scope of the consent. Assuming expressive behaviour is required for valid consent, how does the expressive act interact with the conversational context to determine this normative scope? To address this question, I discuss two possible conditions for this scope. The “Publicity Condition” is that both consent-giver and consent-receiver are aware of the normative scope. The “Intentional Control Condition” is that a consent-giver intentionally controls the normative scope. My first thesis is that the Publicity Condition and the Intentional Control Condition preclude background conventions from fixing the normative scope. My second thesis is that the Publicity Condition is in tension with the Intentional Control Condition. Should we qualify or reject either condition? I argue the answer depends on the type of consent by comparing sexual consent and consent to uses of commercial property.

The Shame of Shamelessness
Gail Weiss, George Washington University
 In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre suggests that shame is a function of our being-for-others. Frantz Fanon, Sandra Bartky, and other critical race, feminist, and disability theorists both draw upon and problematize his account, pointing out that sexual, racial, and other minorities have historically been more prone to be shamed by others, even if they have done nothing to deserve the latter’s moral condemnation. Taking up a related, yet often overlooked phenomenon, I analyze how an individual’s failure to experience shame when committing discriminatory actions can produce a strong sense of shame (or “second-hand” shame) in other people. This second-hand shame, I argue, intensifies the moral burden for those who experience it: witnessing the shameless behavior of others, I am ashamed for their offensive behavior as well as their blameworthy response. In short, the “shame of shamelessness” arises when we feel compelled to perform other people’s moral labor for them.

The Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Literature
Dimitris Apostolopoulos, University of Notre Dame
 Scholarly discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics generally focus on visual art. However, by Merleau-Ponty’s own admission, his philosophy of literature is central to his later thought. In this paper, I argue that reflections on literature were decisive for the formulation of Merleau-Ponty’s later account of philosophical language. After suggesting that Merleau-Ponty recognizes the relative priority of literary over visual arts, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s study of Proust and Valéry during the 1950s furnished him with the conceptual resources to develop his account of indirect or ‘operative’ language. In particular, these writers demonstrated the possibility of formulating a phenomenological language that is both descriptive and creative. Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on literary language ultimately motivate the development of a phenomenological philosophy that takes direction from literary expression. This result, I conclude, can help to clarify some of Merleau-Ponty’s more radical conclusions about the role of language.

The Tension Between Judgment Internalism and Moral Understanding
Nathan Robert Howard, University of Southern California
 Judgment internalists hold, roughly, that if an agent believes that an action should be done, she is defeasibly motivated to perform it. On the internalist’s picture, the agent’s intention is explained by the fact that she makes a practical judgment rather than by, say, her standing desire to do what’s right. However, in this paper, I argue, just as many others have before, that internalists overstate the effect of making a practical judgment on an agent’s motivational state. But unlike these critics, I think the key to understanding why internalism fails lies in moral understanding. I argue that if an agent does not so understand, she can rationally fail to act in the required way even when she believes that she should so act. In other words, understanding why you should give to charity has a motivational effect distinct from merely believing that you should do it.

The Transformative Experience of Radical Sensory Change: Scaling up from Epistemic Transformation to Personal Transformation
L. A. Paul, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 I argue that we grasp distinctive, self-involving truths, or de se truths, through immersive experience. Drawing on examples involving gameplay and virtual reality, I defend the epistemic value of immersive exploration and virtual first personal perspectives. I then develop the connection between immersive modes of presentation, the de se, and transformative experience, and show how our grasp of qualitative truths in experience relates to our grasp of de se truths in experience. I close my discussion by exploring a case where an epistemic transformation scales up into a personal transformation, where the discovery of new phenomenal truths leads to the discovery of new de se truths.

The Value of Moral Distress in Medical Practice
Daniel Tigard, Tulane University of New Orleans
 Recent medical literature shows increasing attention to practitioners’ emotional experience. Moral distress, in particular, is often said to result from the difficult decisions made and the troubling situations encountered by nurses and physicians. The nature of moral distress, however, is unclear. Furthermore, because moral distress has been seen as one of the leading causes of professional dissatisfaction and burnout in medical staff, moral distress is typically understood as a purely negative phenomenon. Given the natural desire to avoid shortages in medical staff, it seems to most authors that systematic efforts should be made to drastically reduce moral distress, if not altogether eliminate it from the professional lives of vulnerable practitioners. Such efforts would be problematic, I argue, as moral distress is much more than a purely negative experience. The ability to experience it is partly constitutive of a virtuous moral character, and the experience itself allows for critical moral maturation.

The Value of Objects in the Plenitude
Irem Kurtsal Steen, Bo─čaziçi University
 Would it be good for there to be a plenitude, or would it be better for there to be fewer objects? Opponents find ontological permissivism’s liberal conception of objects repulsive, but the reason for this is often not articulated. Here, I argue that the worry is that if there is a plenitude of objects, then objecthood would not have any value. Then I show that many gerrymandered objects namely, conceptual works of art, have value. So, the worry that the existence of the gerrymandered objects can diminish the value of objecthood is unfounded. On the contrary, there is value (e.g. artistic value) in recognizing things with “nondescript” modal profiles, since this is an exploration of objects that are not mundane.

The Value of Privileged Access
Jared Peterson, Northwestern University
 It is a commonly held view that we stand in a special epistemic relationship with respect to certain facts about our minds, a relationship that is known as privileged access. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that we either lack privileged access entirely, or that the scope of such access is severely limited. While there have been a number of attempts in the literature to respond to these skeptics, one question that has not been addressed is what, if anything, of value we fail to possess if these skeptics are right. In this paper, I argue that insofar as we lack privileged access, something of significant value would be absent from our cognitive lives. I defend this claim by developing the novel position that privileged access, in most cases, constitutes a type of epistemic control that is both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable to those who possess it.

The Vehicles of Temporal Experience
Michael Bruno, Mississippi State University
 Temporal experiences are conscious episodes that present or represent time-related features of reality. They are of, or individuated by, properties like succession or simultaneity. The vehicles of temporal experiences are the events that ground, realize, or determine their occurrences. A lively debate exists between atomists, who deny temporal experiences are ever process-like, and extensionalists, who maintain there are tracking or mirroring relations between temporal properties of experiences and their vehicles. I defend a hybrid model consistent with atomism at short time-scales, but which incorporates extensionalism at the longer intervals needed to realize experiences of presence and passage. I further argue that extensionalism at this time-scale when conjoined with an enactive theory of perceptual consciousness, which requires active deployment of practical sensorimotor understanding for the occurrence of some kinds of experiences, furnishes a compelling case for thinking that the vehicles of consciousness often include parts of the non-bodily world.

Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism
Andrew Brenner, University of Notre Dame
 Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the purported fact that moral truths figure as components in some good explanations of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and explanationist defenses of moral realism. Theistic explanations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is ineliminable in an important respect—remove the moral facts from those explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral explanations seem to diff er from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered by moral explanationists. I also argue that the theistic moral explanationist defense of moral realism has other important advantages over previous moral explanationist defenses of moral realism. These advantages should make the theistic moral explanationist view of general interest, beyond the more obvious interest it might have for theists.

There Is No Diachronic Cognitive Penetration
Daniel Burnston, Tulane University of New Orleans
 Several theorists have recently argued that perception is diachronically cognitively penetrated. That is, the kinds that we can come to perceive over time, over the course of perceptual learning, depend in a systematic way on the content of the beliefs that we have. I argue that once we think seriously about how perceptual category learning works, and about the content of the beliefs we are likely to have in the course of that learning, the dCPT comes out as a poor description of the process.

Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures
Jan Sprenger, Tilburg University
Jacob Stegenga, University of Cambridge
 Data from medical research is typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute outcome measures over relative outcome measures. The first argument is epistemic: absolute measures permit more reliable inferences than relative measures, because relative measures promote the base-rate fallacy. The second is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is based on probabilistic measures of causal strength: when combining measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy desirable properties while relative measures do not. Absolute outcome measures are better than relative measures.

Three Portraits of Socratic Philosophy in Plato’s Early Dialogues
William Prior, Santa Clara University
 I argue that in Plato’s early dialogues there are at least three portraits of Socratic philosophy. First, there is the “barren” Socrates, who refuses to answer the questions he raises because he has no wisdom. Second, there is the “fertile” Socrates who, though he maintains his lack of knowledge, goes on to answer the questions he raises. One version of this Socrates is the classic intellectualist, who holds that virtue is knowledge, wrongdoing is ignorance, no one desires evil, and akrasia is impossible. Another version is a proto-Platonic Socrates, who holds that virtue is psychic order, and temperance involves control over the appetites, which exist in a separate part of the soul. The barren and fertile Socrates might be reconciled by means of irony, but the distinction between the intellectualist Socrates and the proto-Platonic Socrates remains. I speculate about why Plato might have chosen to present Socrates in this way.

Time and the Schematism in Husserl, Heidegger, and Kant
James Kinkaid, Boston University
 Heidegger’s claim in Being and Time that time is the “horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being” has been interpreted as committing him to a form of idealism. I offer a realist interpretation of this claim by arguing that Heidegger adopts and extends Husserl’s realist project of “constitutional analysis,” which analyzes the types of “horizonal intentionality” that allow things to be given in perception. The most basic kind of horizonal intentionality is time-consciousness, which allows for the perception of substances (i.e. things persisting through time, motion, and qualitative change). Husserlian time-consciousness thus functions much like the schematism of the category of substance in Kant, which Heidegger draws upon in his account of the temporality of the understanding of being. The Husserlian-Kantian view needs to be amended, however, in order to give constitutional analyses of entities with modes of being other than substantiality, e.g., Dasein and available entities like tools.

Toward a Theory of Quantificational Probability
Benjamin Lennertz, Western Kentucky University
 In this poster, I make progress toward expanding probability theory to include a new notion—quantificational probability. I first suggest why we might want such a notion—that there appears to be a role for it that is not served by any parts of more traditional probability theory. Next, I present an obvious worry about expanding probability theory to include quantificational probability—that quantificational probabilities are not unique and cannot be represented by a function. Then, I suggest that we can avoid this worry by allowing our theory to use relations rather than functions to represent quantificational probabilities. Finally, I suggest that quantificational probability, modeled by our new relation, is a genuine sort of probability concept since it seems to satisfy probability axioms (appropriately modified for the function to relation change).

Triviality Results and the Relationship Between Logical and Natural Languages
Justin Khoo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Matthew Mandelkern, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Inquiry into the meaning of logical terms in natural language—particularly conditional operators, our focus—has proceeded along two dimensions. On one hand, semantic theories aim to compositionally generate intuitive meanings for natural language sentences. On the other hand, logical theories aim to uncover properties of conditional operators in formal languages. Sometimes logical theories arrive at results which show that no conditional operator has the properties that speaker intuitions suggest natural language conditionals have. When that happens, it may seem that our only recourse is an error theory. In this paper we argue that we may avoid an error theory if sufficient attention is paid to the translation between natural languages and formal language. As a case study, we discuss Gibbard’s triviality result for conditionals, showing that when careful attention is paid to the step from natural to formal languages, its premises turn out to have intuitive counterexamples.

Two Arguments for Autonomy Education: A Defense
Gina Schouten, Illinois State University
 Several philosophers of education argue that schooling should facilitate students’ development of autonomy. Such arguments fall into two main categories: Student-centered arguments support autonomy education to enable students to lead good lives; Public-centered arguments support autonomy education to develop students into good citizens. Critics challenge the legitimacy of autonomy education—of the state exercising coercive political power to impose a curriculum aimed at making children autonomous. In this paper, I try to offer a unified solution to the legitimacy challenges that both arguments face. Further, I explain why we should pursue both arguments, rather than resting the case for autonomy education on one or the other. I am hardly the first to argue that autonomy education is compliant with constraints on liberal legitimacy. But my defense of autonomy education is distinct in ways that, I hope, enable it to succeed where other such defenses have not.

Understanding Austin’s Way with Skepticism
Mark Kaplan, Indiana University Bloomington
 J. L. Austin is famous for the extent to which he appears to have presupposed that it is a condition of adequacy, on what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. Most would use the term, “infamous.” Not long after Austin’s death, there formed a durable consensus: Austin’s commitment to pursuing an epistemology that is faithful to “ordinary language” was fundamentally misguided—born of a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. My brief, however, is that the consensus is mistaken. Austin has been misread. Both the condition of adequacy to which he was committed, and his reason for being committed to it, have been misconstrued by his critics. Austin’s way of pursuing epistemology was born, not of a misunderstanding of the epistemologist’s project, but of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived.

Useful False Knowledge Attributions
Gregory Stoutenburg, University of Idaho
 There is a lot we can accomplish by means of false or inaccurate uses of language. That opens the door to the possibility that knowledge attributions may be among the expressions that are often false but are nevertheless usefully deployed in many contexts. In this paper, I argue that these facts about language use provide the basis for an account of the utility of knowledge attributions that is compatible with our knowing very little. In particular, I argue that knowledge attributions may often be false while still being useful for precisely the same purposes that other philosophers have identified.

Using the Master’s Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House? A Feminist Comment on the Way We Think About Imposter Phenomenon
Shanna Slank, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 Within the abundant discourse on Imposter Syndrome, or Imposter Phenomenon (“IP”), there is a standard way of thinking about what the phenomenon is. This standard view includes attributing to an IP-individual inaccurate beliefs about the extent to which he is causally responsible for his successes. In this paper, I argue that in adopting the standard view, we may be making a mistake that feminists have long cautioned against—the mistake of falling into a default conceptualization that blinds us to certain harms or injustices. I propose an alternative way of thinking about IP, in which those who do not suffer IP—rather than those who do—have inaccurate beliefs about the causal structure of individual success. While there is insufficient empirical evidence to adjudicate between the two proposals, I contend that countenancing the alternative is nevertheless important-especially in domains in which IP is prominent, including professional Philosophy.

Virtues for Agents in Directed Social Networks
Mark Alfano, University of Oregon
 The sender-receiver dyad is central to recent attempts to expand the social horizons of epistemology. While this dyad adequately characterizes many talk exchanges, human testimonial practices are embedded in a larger context that includes the possibilities of overhearing, of remembering or forgetting what was said, and of retelling it back to the speaker and to new audiences. Building on this idea, I propose a new holistic framework for testimonial ethics, in which distinct virtues attach to each of these potential communicative roles. I enumerate the virtues related to each role and connect them with literatures in philosophy of language, virtue epistemology, virtue ethics, social psychology, clinical psychology, and data science. While some of these virtues are well-studied, others have been scanted. A rough taxonomy covers four types: source virtues, receiver virtues, conduit virtues, and echoic virtues.

Vision Deranged
Tomasz Wysocki, Washington University in St. Louis
 Some philosophers analyze the concept of seeing in reliabilist terms: you see if your veridical visual experience was produced a reliable process—where reliability is explained either in terms of past performance (Pears, 1976) or in terms of counterfactuals (Lewis, 1980). I argue that these accounts the concept of seeing are too narrow. That is, there are cases that count as hallucination (rather than vision) on these analyses, but as seeing on the folk concept. To show where they fail, first I explain the theories, and then show that they make certain predictions that laypersons’ intuitions don’t agree with.

Voluntariness and the Appropriateness of Blame
Kyle Fritz, University of Mississippi
Daniel Miller, Florida State University
 Many accept that blame can be inappropriate, even if an agent is blameworthy. Yet almost no work has been done to elucidate what this notion of “appropriateness” means. We argue that the appropriateness of blame is best understood as an all-things-considered moral notion. Permissibility is encompassing in this way, but attempts to understand appropriateness as permissibility face an apparent problem when confronted with nonvoluntary blame. One must either accept that the scope of moral obligation extends to nonvoluntary items such as beliefs and attitudes, or one must adopt a disjunctive account that offers a distinct conception of appropriateness in terms of value for cases of nonvoluntary blame. The disjunctive view, however, cannot accommodate some morally relevant considerations, such as rights, purely in value terms. Understanding appropriateness either as unified or disjunctive has costs, and yet any serious work on the ethics of blame must choose one of these options.

Well-being and Compliance with Oppression
Rosa Terlazzo, Kansas State University
 Several philosophers have recently argued that victims of oppression have self-regarding duties to resist oppression that are grounded in their obligation to protect and promote their own well-being. This requires that complying with oppression compromises the well-being of victims. In this paper, I argue that individual instances of complying with oppression might in fact robustly promote the well-being of victims of oppression. This will be so in cases in which the activities incentivized by oppression are the activities that victims would prefer to engage in for their own sakes even in near-by non-oppressive worlds. I propose three ways in which we might reasonably expect that victims would come to have this relationship to oppressive practices. While I grant that the well-being of victims would be maximized by engaging in those behaviors in non-oppressive circumstances, victims who must act in oppressive circumstances might do prudentially better by complying than resisting.

What Do Symmetries Tell Us About Structure?
Thomas Barrett, Princeton University
 Mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of physics often look to the symmetries of an object for insight into the “structure” or “constitution” of the object. My aim in this paper is to explain why this practice is successful. In order to do so, I prove two theorems that are closely related to (and in a sense, generalizations of) Beth’s and Svenonius’ theorems.

What Skill Is Not
Evan Riley, College of Wooster
 A dispositional theory of skill, of the particular sort recently proposed by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, might seem promising. Such a theory looks to provide a unified account of skill, reflecting insights garnered from cognitive science and philosophy, while also supporting intellectualism concerning knowing-how. I appeal to a pair of counterexamples to argue against any dispositional theory of this kind. The lesson, in short, is that skill is broadly answerable to the will. A person may thus be characteristically disposed against the exercise of her skill and disposed also against any associated intentional formings of knowledge. Yet clearly she does not cease thereby to be skilled. I consider four possible replies on behalf of the dispositional account, none of which vindicate it. The theory fails. Further reflection suggests that in accounting for at least some kinds of knowing-how a basic appeal to rational ability is unavoidable.

What the Future ‘Might’ Brings
David Boylan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 I show here that unexpected complexities arise from the interaction of epistemic modals and future tense. I argue this undermines a very general approach to the semantics of epistemic modals, one which draws a very tight connection between epistemic modality and knowledge attributions. I outline a new way of determining the domain of quantification of epistemic modals. Further I suggest it is evidence for a different general approach to epistemic modals which blurs the distinction between epistemic and historical modality.

When Huayan Buddhism Meets Analytic Metaphysics
Li Kang, Syracuse University
 Huayan Buddhism is well-known for claiming that everything depends on everything else. Yet Huayan’s interdependence is incompatible with the orthodoxy of analytic metaphysics, according to which there are independent things and dependence is never symmetric. What’s worse, Huayan’s interdependence is implied by two obscure—if not paradoxical—claims: everything is identical to everything else, and everything contains everything else. Facing these difficulties, I construct a two-fold contemporary version of Huayan. First, Huayan’s interdependence is intelligible if we draw certain analogies between dependence and universal gravitation. It turns out that Huayan inspires an alternative account of dependence to the orthodoxy of analytic metaphysics. Second, resources in analytic metaphysics—the definitional account of essence and the essentialist account of dependence—clarify, demystify, and unify Huayan thoughts.

Whither Merely Possible Objects
Timothy Cleveland, New Mexico State University
 In his book Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson defends necessitism, the claim that “necessarily everything is necessarily something” (p. 2). According to Williamson, our best overall theories of quantified modal logic commit us to necessitism via the Barcan Formula, which says, if it is possible that something meets the condition A, then there is something that is possibly A. The Barcan formula seems to entail that there are some merely possible objects, such as a merely possible iceberg in the Atlantic. This merely possible iceberg in the Atlantic is not a concrete iceberg but a non-concrete, possibly concrete iceberg in the Atlantic. Necessitism has it that “…it is necessary what there is, not how it is” (p. 2). In this paper, I will raise some doubts about whether we can have any positive conception of these merely possible objects. They are mysterious entities indeed.

Who’s Afraid of Slurs?
Nicole Dular, Syracuse University
Matthias Jenny, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 We address the question of what we should do with slurs: whether we should ever use them, and if so, who should and to what end. Given that slurs are often used as a tool of oppression, it’s tempting to think that no usage of slurs could ever achieve any good when it comes to the task of undermining oppression. However, we argue that in-group slur use can serve as a tool to undermine oppression. We identify four tools that work to undermine oppression-unity, consciousness-raising, social criticism, and social activism-and argue that in-group uses of slurs can play a crucial role in achieving each of them.

Why Consequentialize?
Christa Johnson, Ohio State University
 It has become increasingly popular to argue that all normative theories can be “turned into” consequentialist views. The trick? Take whatever is deontically important to your view and make it a part of the axiology that agents must maximize. The approach that consequentialism is famous for, bringing about the best world, remains intact, while capturing nonconsequentialist intuitions. In response to this “consequentializing project,” many have tried to show that consequentializing fails. However, few, in any, call into question whether we ought to engage in the project in the first place. This is what I want to challenge. In this paper, I argue that even granting we can consequentialize, we ought not to. I defend this view in two stages. First, I refute the purported benefits of consequentializing, concluding that consequentializing at best is a theoretically neutral endeavor. Second, I argue that there are indeed theoretical costs to consequentializing.

Why Feminism Entails (Real) Panpsychism
Jennifer McWeeny, Worcester Polytechnic Institute
 Feminist philosophers have long argued that mind-body dualism facilitates oppression because it entails a hierarchical valuation of the mental over the bodily that respectively maps onto differential valuations of men and women. Recently, Galen Strawson and David Chalmers have championed the metaphysical position of panpsychism in virtue of its capacity to overcome the mind-body problem without positing emergence or generating conceivability problems in regard to the nature of mind. If they are correct that panpsychism is the most viable alternative to Cartesian dualism, then the following question arises: Must feminism be grounded in a panpsychic metaphysics? This paper develops an argument for the affirmative position. However, not just any kind of panpsychism is consistent with feminism. Unlike the versions of panpsychism advocated by Strawson and Chalmers, feminist panpsychism must be a “real panpsychism” that attributes minds all the way down to rocks, plants, inanimate objects, and so on.

Why Inference to the Best Explanation Won’t Get You Mathematical Platonism
Kenneth Boyce, University of Missouri
 Proponents of the traditional Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical platonism have argued that the indispensable use of mathematics in our best scientific theories affords us with strong empirical grounds for believing that mathematical entities exist. A well-known weakness in the traditional indispensability argument is that it relies on a now widely discredited view of confirmation, namely confirmational holism. Contemporary defenders of the indispensability argument have sought to bypass this reliance by emphasizing the indispensable role mathematics plays in scientific explanation. I argue that this explanatory version of the indispensability argument relies on an analog of confirmational holism that also turns out to be false.

Why Offense is Not an Emotion (And Why That Matters)
Allan Hazlett, University of New Mexico
 Appeals to offense are sometimes criticized on the grounds that they are appeals to emotion: saying that you are offended by something, or that you find it offensive, is just to say that it makes you feel a certain way, which is not (so the argument goes) a legitimate criticism. One thing this objection gets wrong is the assumption that emotions are merely feelings, but another, which is my topic in this paper, is the idea that offense is an emotion. I argue that offense is essentially cognitive, and not essentially affective: it is possible to be offended or to take offense without feeling anything. This undermines the aforementioned objection, but it also has consequences for the intellectual ethics of appeals to offense: undefended appeals to offense are problematic, in the manner of undefended assumptions, and can in some contexts manifest a species of incivility.

Why Practical Reason Cannot Be Merely Calculative
Carlo DaVia, Fordham University
 Candace Vogler has posed a serious challenge to ethicists who see reason and virtue as necessarily connected such that it is impossible for a vicious person to be practically rational. She argues that practical reason is calculative in form, always concerned with determining either the means to, or the constitutive parts of, a pre-determined end. On this view, good practical reasoning is reasoning well about the means to, or the constitutive parts of, some end. So understood, the cunning Mafioso can be rightly accused of being bad, but not irrational. I challenge this account of practical reason by defending the claim that a practical end is never fully pre-determined, and so it can always be given determinate content through the process of deliberation. By deliberating about how to be a good friend, we may learn something about friendship over and above how presently to go about being one.

Why the Equality View of Religious Liberty Should Reject the Ministerial Exception
Sabine Tsuruda, University of California, Los Angeles
 According to Lawrence Sager and Christopher Eisgruber’s equality view of religious liberty, “religious enterprises are entitled to robust constitutional protection against discrimination but not to the improbable privilege of disobeying otherwise valid laws.” The ministerial exception to employment discrimination law seems plainly in conflict with the equality view, permitting churches to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, religion, and the like in their employment of ministers. Even so, Sager argues that the ministerial exception may be compatible with the equality view if the exception can rest on grounds other than religious autonomy, such as the intimate association between congregations and their clerics. In this paper, I argue that even if church selection of ministers implicates important associational rights, the ministerial exception may still be incompatible with the equality view because the exception undermines equal status in a central domain of social cooperation—the paid workplace.